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EUTHANASIA
AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH
THE CASE FOR VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA

Edited by A. B. Downing
,:;,

Nor dread nor hope attend
A dying animal.
A man awaits his end,
Dreading and hoping all.
-W. B. YEATS

II
PETER OWEN

· LONDON

YALE KAMISAR

Euthanada Legislation: Some Non-Religious
0 bjections*
A book by Glanville Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law,1 once again brought to the fore the controversial topic
of euthanasia, more popularly known as 'mercy-killing'. In keep_ing with the trend of the e.uthanasia movement over the past
generation, Williams concentrates his efforts for reform on the
~ t y p e of euthanasia, for
le the cancer victim begging for death, as opposed to th involunta variety-that is, the
case of the congenital idiot, the perm
msane or the senile.
When a legal scholar of Williams's stature joins the ranks of
such formidable law thinkers as America's Herbert Wechsler and
the late Jerome Michael, and England's Hermann Mannheim in
approving voluntary euthanasia at least in certain circumstances, a
major exploration of the bases for the euthanasia prohibition seems
in order. This need is underscored by the fact that Williams's book
arrived on the scene soon after the stir caused by the plea for
voluntary euthanasia contained in a book by a brilliant American
Anglican clergyman. 2
The Law on the Books condemns all mercy-killings. 8 That this
has a substantial deterrent effect, even its harshest critics admit.
Of course, it does not stamp out all mercy-killings, just as murder and rape provisions do· not stamp out all murder and rape,
but presumably it does impose a substantially greater responsibility
on physicians and relatives in a euthanasia situation and turns
them away from significantly more doubtful cases than would
otherwise be the practice under any proposed euthanasia legislation to date. When a mercy-killing occurs, however, The Law in
Action is as malleable as The Law on the Books is uncompromising.
The high incidence of failures to indict, acquittals, suspended sentences and reprieves lends considerable support to the view that :
• The notes for this article appear on pp. 118-33.
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If the circumstances are so compelling that the defendant ought
to violate the law, then they are compelling enough for the
jury to violate their oaths. The law does well to declare these
homicides unlawful. It does equally well to put no more than
the sanction of an oath in the way of an acquittal.
The complaint has been registered that 'the prospect of a sentimental acquittal cannot be reckoned as a certainty'. 4 Of course
not. The defendant is not always entitled to a sentimental acquittal.
The few American convictions cited for the proposition that the
present state of affairs breeds 'inequality' in application may be
cited as well for the proposition that it is characterized by elasticity
and flexibility. In any event, if inequality of application suffices to
damn a particular provision of the criminal law, we might as well
tear up all our codes-beginning with the section on chickenstealing.
The existing law on euthanasia is hardly perfect. But if it is
not too good, neither, as I have suggested, is it much worse than
the rest of the criminal law. At any rate, the imperfections of
existing law are not cured by Williams's proposal. Indeed, I believe adoption of his views would add more difficulties than it
would remove.
Williams strongly suggests that 'euthanasia can be condemned
only according to a religious opinion'.~ He tends to view the opposing camps as Roman Catholics versus Liberals. Although this has a
certain initial appeal to me, a non-Catholic and self-styled liberal,
~ deny that this is the only way the battle lines can, or should, be
forawn. I leave the religious arguments to the theologians. I share
the view that 'those who hold the faith may follow its precepts
without requiring those who do not hold it to act as if they did'. 6 /
VBut I do find substantial utilitarian obstacles on the high road to
euthanasia. I am not enamoured of the status quo on mercy-killing.
But while I am not prepared to defend it against all comers, I am
prepared to defend it against the proposals for change which have
come forth to date.
As an ultimate philosophical proposition, the case for voluntary
euthanasia· is strong. Whatever may be said for and against suicide
t:U generally, the appeal of death is immeasurably greater when it is
sought not for a poor reason or just any reason, but for 'good

<
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cause', so to speak; when it is invoked not on behalf of a 'socially
useful' person, but on behalf of, /pr example, the pain-racked 'hopelessly incurable' cancer victim.~/ a person is in fact (I) presently
incurable, (2) beyond the aid of any respite which may come along
in his life expectancy, suffering (3) intolerable and (4) unmitigable
pain and of a (5) fixed and (6) rational desire to die, I would hate
to have to argue that the hand of death should be stayed. But
abstract propositions and carefully formed hypotheticals are one
thing; specific proposals designed to cover everyday situations are
something else again./
, In essence, Williams's specific proposal is that death be authorized for a person in the above situation 'by giving the medical
practitioner a wide discretion and trusting to his good sense' .7
This, I submit, raises too great a risk of abuse and mistake to warrant a change in the existing law. That a proposal entails risk of
mistake is hardly a conclusive reason against it. But neither is it
irrelevant. Under any euthanasia programme the consequences of
mistake, of course, are always fatal. As I shall endeavour to show,
the incidence of mistake of one kind or another is likely to be
quite appreciable. If this indeed be the case, unless the need for
the authorized conduct is compelling enough to override it, I take
it the risk of mistake is a conclusive reason against such authorization. I submit, too, that the possible radiations from the proposed
legislation-for example, involuntary euthanasia of idiots and
imbeciles (the typical 'mercy-killings' reported by the press)--and
the emergence of the legal precedent that there are lives not
'worth living', give additional cause for reflection.
I see the issue, then, as the need for voluntary euthanasia versus
(1) the incidence of mistake and abuse; and (2) the danger that
legal machinery initially designed to kill those who are a nuisance
to themselves may some day engulf those who are a nuisance to
others. 8
The 'freedom to choose a merciful death by euthanasia' may
well be regarded as a special area of civil liberties. This is definitely
a part of Professor Williams's approach:
If the law were to remove its ban on euthanasia, the effect would
merely be to leave this subject to the individual conscience. This
proposal would . . . be easy to defend, as restoring personal liberty
in a field in which men differ on the question of conscience. . . .
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On a question like this there is surely everything to be said for
the liberty of the individual. 9
I am perfectly willing to accept civil liberties as the battlefield,
but issues of 'liberty' and 'freedom' mean little until we begin to
pin down !.£,hose 'liberty' and 'freedom' and for what need and at
what pricefWilliams champions thee 'personal liberty' of the dying
to die painlessly. I am more concerned about the life and liberty
of those who would needlessly be killed in the process or who
would irrationally choose to partake of the process. Williams's price
on behalf of those who are in fact 'hopeless incurables' and in
fact of a fixed and rational desire to die is the sacrifice of (1) some
few, who, though they know it not, because their physicians know
it not, need not and should not die; (2) others, probably not so
few, who, though they go through the motions of 'volunteering',
are casualties of strain, pain or narcotics to such an extent that
they really know not what they do. My price on behalf of those
who, despite appearances to the contrary, have some relatively
normal and reasonably useful life left in them, or who are incapable
of making the choice, is the lingering on for awhile of those who,
if you will, in fact have no desire and no reason to linger onf

1.

A Close-up View of Voluntary Euthanasia

A. THE EUTHANASIAST's DILEMMA AND WILLIAMs's
PROPOSED SOLUTION

As if the general principle they advocate did not raise enough
difficulties in itself, euthanasiasts have learned only too bitterly
that specific plans of enforcement are often much less palat~ble
than the abstract notions they are designed to effectuate. In the
case of voluntary euthanasia, the means of implementation vary
from (1) the simple proposal that mercy-killings by anyone, typically relatives, be immunized from the criminal law; to (2) the
elaborate legal machinery contained in the bills of the Euthanasia
Society (England) and the Euthanasia Society of America for
carrying out euthanasia.
The British Society, in the Bill it originally proposed, would require the eligible patient-that is, a person over twenty-one who
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is 'suffering from a disease involving severe pain and of an incurable and fatal character',1° to forward a specially prescribed _a.pplication, along with two medical certificates, one signed by the attendlllg physician, and the other by a specially qualified physician, to
a specially appointed Euthanasia Referee 'who shall satisfy himself by means of a personal interview with the patient and otherwise that the said conditions shall have been fulfilled and that the
patient fully understands the nature and purpose of the application'; and, if so satisfied, shall then send a euthanasia permit to
the patient; which permit shall, seven days after receipt, become
'op~r<1:tive' in the presence of an official_witness; unless the nearest
relative manages to cancel the permit by persuading a court of appropriate jurisdiction that the requisite conditions have not been met.
The American Society would have the eligible patient-that is,
one over twenty-one 'suffering from severe physical ,pain caused
by a disease for which no remedy affording lasting relief or recovery is at the time known to medical science', 11 petition for
euthanasia in the presence of two witnesses and file
along
with the certificate of an attending ph~i<,:ian, in a court of appropriate jurisdiction; said court then to appoint a committee of three,
of whom at least two must be physicians, 'who shall forthwith
examine the patient and such other persons as they deem advisable
or as the court may direct and within five days after their appointment, shall report to the c6urt whether or not the patient understands the nature and purpose of the petition and comes within
the [act's] provisions'; whereupon, if the report is in the affirmative, the court shall-'unless there is some reason to believe that
the report is erroneous or untrue'-grant the petition; in which
event euthanasia is to be administered in the presence of the committee, or any two members thereof.
As will be seen, and as might be expected, the simple negative
proposal to remove 'mercy-killings' from the ban of the criminal
law is strenuously resisted on the ground that it offers the patient
far too little protection from not-so-necessary or not-so-merciful
killings. On the other hand, the elaborate affirmative proposals of
the Euthanasia Societies meet much pronounced eye-blinking, not
a few guffaws, and sharp criticism that the legal machinery is so
drawn-out, so complex, so formal and so tedious as to offer the
patient far too little solace.

same,.
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The naked suggestion that mercy-killing be made a good defence
against a charge of criminal homicide appears to have no prospect
of success in the foreseeable future. Only recently, the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 'reluctantly' concluded that such
homicides could not feasibly be taken out of the category of murder, let alone completely immunized :
[Witnesses) thought it would be most dangerous to provide that
'mercy-killings' should not be murder, because it would be impossible to define a category which could not be seriously abused.
Such a definition could only be in terms of the motive of the
offender . . . which is notoriously difficult to establish and cannot, like intent, be inferred from a person's overt actions. Moreover, it was agreed by almost all witnesses, including those who
thought that there would be no real difficulty in discriminating
between genuine and spurious suicide pacts, that, even if such
a definition could be devised, it would in practice often prove
extremely difficult to distinguish killings where the motive was
merciful from those where it was not. How, for example, were
the jury to decide whether a daughter had kiiled her invalid
father from compassion, from a desire for material gain, from
a natural wish to bring to an end a trying period of her life, or
from a combination of motives ?12
While the appeal in simply taking 'mercy-killings' off the books
is dulled by the likelihood of abuse, the force of the idea is likewise substantially diminished by the encumbering protective features proposed by the American and British Societiesfflms, Lord
. Dawson, an eminent medical member of the House of Lords and
one of the great leaders of the British medical profession, protested
that the <British <Bill 'would turn the sick-room into a bureau',
that he was revolted by 'the very idea of the sick-chamber being
visited by officials and the patient, who is struggling with this
dire malady, being treated as if it was a case of insanity'. 18 Dr A.
Leslie Banks, then Principal Medical Officer of the Ministry of
Health, reflected that the proposed machinery would 'produce an
atmosphere quite foreign to all accepted notions of dying in
peace'. 14 Dr I. Phillips Frohman has similarly objected to the
American Bill as one whose 'whole procedure is so lengthy that it
does not seem consonant either with the "mercy" motive on which
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presumably it is based, or with the "bearableness" of the pain' .15
The extensive procedural concern of the euthanasia bills has
repelled many, but perhaps the best evidence of its psychological
misconception is that it has distressed sympathizers with the movement as well. The very year the British Society was organized and
a proposed bill drafted, Dr Harry Roberts obsetved :
We all realize the intensified horror attached to the death-penalty
by its accompanying formalities--from the phraseology of the
judge's sentence, and his black cap, to the weight-gauging visit
of the hangman to the cell, and the correct attendance at the
final scene of the surpliced chaplain, the doctor and the prison
governor. This is not irrelevant to the problem of legalized
euthanasia. 16 /;
After discussing the many procedural steps of the British Bill Dr
Roberts obsetved, 'I can almost hear the cheerful announcement :
"please, ma'am, the euthanizer's come".'
At a meeting of the Medico-Legal Society, Dr Kenneth McFadyean, after reminding the group that 'some time ago I stated from
a public platform that I had practised euthanasia for twenty years
and I do not believe I am running risks because I have helped a
hopeless sufferer out of this life', commented on the British Bill
that
There was no comparison between being in a position to make
a will and making a patient choose his own death at any stated
moment. The patient had to discuss it-not once with his own
doctor, but two, three, or even four times with strangers, which
was no solace or comfort to people suffering intolerable pain. 17
Nothing rouses Professor Glanville 'Williams's ire more than the
fact that opponents of the euthanasia movement argue that euthanasia proposals offer either inadequate protection or over-elaborate
safeguards. Williams appears to meet this dilemma with the insinuation that because arguments are made in the antithesis they
must each be invalid, each be obstructionist, and each be made in
bad faith. 18
It just may be, however, that each alternative argument is quite
valid, that the trouble lies with the euthanasiasts themselves in seek91
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ing a goal which is inherently inconsistent : a procedure for death
which both (1) provides ample safeguards against abuse and mistake, and (2) is 'quick' and 'easy' in operation. Professor Williams
meets the problem with more than bitter comments about the
tactics of the opposition. He makes a brave try to break through
the dilemma :
[T]he reformers might be well advised, in their next proposal,
to abandon all their cumbrous safeguards and to do as their
opponents wish, giving the medical practitioner a wide discretion and trusting to his good sense.
[T]he essence of the bill would then be simple. It would provide that no medical practitioner should be guilty of an offence
in respect of an act done intentionally to accelerate the death of
a patient who is seriously ill, unless it is proved that the act was
not done in good faith with the consent of the patient and for
the purpose of saving him from severe pain in an illness believed
to be of an incurable and fatal character. Under this formula
it would be for the physician, if charged, to show that the
patient was seriously ill, but for the prosecution to prove that
the physician acted from some motive other than the humanitarian one allowed to him by law.19
-*'Evidently, the presumption is that the general practitioner is a
sufficient buffer between the patient and the restless spouse, or overwrought or overreaching relative, as well as a depository of enough
general scientific know-how and enough information about current
research developments and trends, to assure a minimum of error
in diagnosis and anticipation of new measures of relief. Whether or
not the general practitioner will accept the responsibility Williams
would confer on him is itself a problem of major proportions. 20
Putting that question aside, the soundness of the underlying premises of Williams's 'legislative suggestion' will be examined in the
course of the discussion of various aspects of the euthanasia
problem./
B. THE 'CHOICE'

Under current proposals to establish legal machinery, elaborate
or otherwise, for the administration of a quick and easy death, it
is not enough that those authorized to pass on the question decide
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that the patient, in effect, is 'better off dead'. The patient must
concur in this opinion. Much of the appeal in the current proposal
lies in this so-called 'voluntary' attribute.
But is the adult patient really in a position to concur? 21 Is he
truly able to make euthanasia a 'voluntary' act? There is a good
deal to be said, is there not, for Dr Frohman's pithy comment that
the 'voluntary' plan is supposed to be carried out 'only if the victwi is both sane and crazed by pain'. 22
~y hypothesis, voluntary euthanasia is not to be resorted to until
narcotics have long since been administered and the patient has
developed a tolerance to them. When, then, does the patient make
the choice? While heavily drugged ?23 Or is narcotic relief to be
withdrawn for the time of decision? But if heavy dosage no longer
deadens pain, indeed, no longer makes it bearable, how overwhelming is it when whatever relief narcotics offer is taken away too?
'Hypersensitivity to pain after analgesia has worn off is nearly
always noted'. 24 Moreover, 'the mental side-effects of narcotics,
unfortunately for anyone wishing to suspend them temporarily
without unduly tormenting the patient, appear to outlast the analgesic effect' and 'by many hours'. 23 The situation is further complicated by the fact that 'a person in terminal stages of cancer who
had been given morphine steadily for a matter of weeks would
certainly be dependent upon it physically and would probably be
addicted to it and react with the addict's response'. 26 /
The narcotics problem aside, Dr Benjamin Miller, who probably
has personally experienced more pain than any other commentator on the euthanasia scene, observes :
Anyone who has been severely ill knows how distorted his judgment became during the worst moments of the illness. Pain and
the toxic effect of disease, or the violent reaction to certain
surgical procedures may change our capacity for rational and
courageous thought. 27
-Z,,Undoubtedly, some euthanasia candidates will have their lucid
moments. How they are to be distinguished from fellow-sufferers
who do not, or how these instances are to be distinguished from
others when the patient is exercising an irrational judgment, is
not an easy matter./Particularly is this so under Williams's propos93
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al, where no specially qualified persons, psychiatrieally trained or
otherwise, are to assist in the process.
,,_;,Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the occasion when a
euthanasia candidate possesses a sufficiently clear mind can be
ascertained and that a request for euthanasia is then made, there
remain other problems. The mind of the pain-racked may occasionally be clear, but is it not also likely to be uncertain and variable? This point was pressed hard by the great physician, Lord
Horder, in the House of Lords debates :
During the morning depression he [the patient] will be found
to favour the application under this Bill, later in the day he will
think quite differently, or will have forgotten all about it. The
mental clarity with which noble Lords who present this Bill
are able to think and to speak must not be thought to have any
counterpart in the alternating moods and confused judgments
of the sick man. 28 {

. !

khe concept of 'voluntary' in voluntary euthanasia would have
1
a great deal more substance to it if, as is the case with voluntary
admission statutes for the mentally ill, the patient retained the
right to reverse the process within a specified number of days after
he gives written notice of his desire to do so--but unfortunately
this cannot be. The choice here, of course, is an irrevocable on~
The likelihood of confusion, distortion or vacillation would appear
to be serious drawbacks to any voluntary plan. Moreover, Williams's proposal is particularly vulnerable in this regard, since as
he admits, by eliminating the fairly elaborate procedure of the
American and British Societies' plans, he also eliminates a time
period which would furnish substantial evidence of the patient's
settled intention to avail himself of euthanasia. 29 But if Williams
does not always choose to slug it out, he can box neatly and parry
gingerly:
[T]he problem can be exaggerated. Every law has to face difficulties in application, and these difficulties are not a conclusive
argument against a law if it has a beneficial operation. The
measure here proposed is designed to meet the situation where
the patient's consent to euthanasia is clear and incontrovertible.
The physician, conscious of the need to protect himself against
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malicious accusations, can devise his own safeguards appropriate
to the circumstances; he would normally be well advised to get
the patient's consent in writing, just as is now the practice before operations. Sometimes the patient's consent will be particularly clear because he will have expressed a desire for ultimate
euthanasia while he is still clear-headed and before he comes to
be racked by pain; if the expression of desire is never revoked,
but rather is reaffirmed under the pain, there is the best possible proof of full consent. If, on the other hand, there is no such
settled frame of mind, and if the physician chooses to administer euthanasia when the patient's mind is in a variable state, he
will be walking in the margin of the law and may find himself
unprotected. 30

If consent is given at a time when the patient's condition has
so degenerated that he has become a fit candidate for euthanasia,
when, if ever, will it be 'clear and incontrovertible'?$Is the suggested alternative of consent in advance a satisfactory solution?
Can such a consent be deemed an informed one? Is this much
different from holding a man to a prior statement of intent that
if such and such an employment opportunity would present itself
he would accept it, or if such and such a young woman were to
come along he would marry her? Need one marshal authority for
the proposition that many an 'iffy' inclination is disregarded when
the actual facts are at hand ? /
*rofessor Williams states that where a pre-pain desire for 'ultimate euthanasia' is 'reaffirmed' under pain, 'there is the best possible proof of full consent'. Perhaps. But what if it is alternately
renounced and reaffirmed under pain? What if it is neither affirmed
or renounced? What if it is only renounced? Will a physician be
free to go ahead on the ground that the prior desire was 'rational',
but the present desire 'irrational'? Under Williams's plan, will not
the physician frequently 'be walking in the margin of the law'just as he is now ?/Do we really accomplish much more under this
proposal than to put the euthanasia principle on the books?
Even if the patient's choice could be said to be 'clear and incontrovertible', do not other difficulties remain? Is this the kind of
choice, assuming that it can be made in a fixed and rational manner, that we want to offer a gravely ill person? Will we not sweep
up, in the process, some who are not really tired of life, but think
95
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others are tired of them; some who do not really want to die, but
who feel they should not live on, because to do so when there
looms the legal alternative of euthanasia is to do a selfish or a
cowardly act? Will not some feel an obligation to have themselves 'eliminated' in order that funds allocated for their terminal
care might be better used by their families or, financial worries
aside, in order to relieve their families of the emotional strain
involved?
It would not be surprising for the gravely ill person to seek to
inquire of those close to him whether he should avail himself of
the legal alternative of euthanasia. Certainly, he is likely to wonder about their attitude in the matter. It is quite possible, is it
not, that he will not exactly be gratified by any inclination on their
part-however noble their motives may be in fact-that he resort
to the new procedure? At this stage, the patient-family relationship
may well be a good deal less than it ought to be.
~nd what of the relatives? If their views will not always influence the patient, will they not at least influence the attending
physician? Will a physician assume the risks to his reputation, if
not his pocketbook, by administering the coup de grace over the
objection-however irrational-of a close relative. Do not the
relatives, then, also have a 'choice'? Is not the decision on their
part to do nothing and say nothing itself a 'choice'? In many
families there will be some, will there not, who will consider a
stand against euthanasia the only proof of love, devotion and
gratitude for past events? What of the stress and strife if close
relatives differ over the desirability of euthanatizing the patient? I
At such a time, members of the family are not likely to be in
the best state of mind, either, to make this kind of decision. Financial stress and conscious or unconscious competition for the family's
estate aside,
The chronic illness and persistent pain in terminal carcinoma
may place strong and excessive stresses upon the family's emotional ties with the patient. The family members who have
strong emotional attachment to start with are most likely to
take the patient's fears, pains and fate personally. Panic often
strikes them. Whatever guilt feelings they may have toward the
patient emerge to plague them.
If the patient is maintained at home, many frustrations and
g6
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physical demands may be imposed on the family by the advanced
illness. There may develop extreme weakness, incontinence and
bad odors. The pressure of caring for the individual under these
circumstances is likely to arouse a resentment and, in tum,
guilt feelings on the part of those who have to do the nursing. 81
Nor should it be overlooked that while Professor Williams would
remove the various procedural steps and personnel contemplated
in the British and American Bills and bank his all on the 'good
sense' of the general practitioner, no man is immune to the fear,
anxieties and frustrations engendered by the apparently helpless,
hopeless patient. Not even the general practitioner:
Working with a patient suffering from a malignancy causes
special problems for the physician. First of all, the patient with
a malignancy is most likely to engender anxiety concerning
death, even in the doctor. And at the same time, this type of
patient constitutes a serious threat or frustration to medical
ambition. As a result, a doctor may react more emotionally and
less objectively than in any other area of medical practice. . . .
His deep concern may make him more pessimistic than is necessary. As a result of the feeling of frustration in his wish to help,
the doctor may have moments of annoyance with the patient.
He may even feel almost inclined to want to avoid this type
of patient. 32
Putting aside the problem of whether the good sense of the
general practitioner warrants dispensing with other personnel,
there still remain the problems posed by any voluntary euthanasia programme : the aforementioned considerable pressures on the
patient and his family. Are these the kind of pressures we want to
inflict on any person, let alone a very sick person? Are these the
kind of pressures we want to impose on any family, let alone an '
emotionally shattered family? And if so, why are they not also
proper considerations for the crippled, the paralyzed, the quadruple
amputee, the iron-lung occupant and their families?
Might it not be said of the existing ban on euthanasia, as Professor Herbert Wechsler has said of the criminal law in another
connection :

It also operates, and perhaps more significantly, at anterior
D
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stages in the patterns of conduct, the dark shadow of organized
disapproval eliminating from the ambit of consideration alternatives that might otherwise present themselves in the final competition of choice. 33

0, THE 'HOPELESSLY INCURABLE' PATIENT AND THE
FALLIBLE DOCTOR

Professor Williams notes as 'standard argument' the plea that 'no
sufferer from an apparently fatal illness should be deprived of his
life because there is always the possibility that the diagnosis is
wrong, or else that some remarkable cure will be discovered in
time'.M But he does not reach the issue until he has already dismissed it with this prefatory remark :
It has been noticed before in this work that writers who object
to a practice for theological reasons frequently try to support
their condemnation on medical grounds. With euthanasia this is
difficult, but the effort is made. 85
Does not Williams, while he pleads that euthanasia be not theologically prejudged, at the same time invite the inference that nontheological objections to euthanasia are simply camouflage?
It is no doubt true that many theological opponents employ
medical arguments as well, but it is also true that the doctor who
has probably most forcefully advanced medical objections to euthanasia of the so-called incurables, Cornell University's worldrenowned Foster Kennedy, a former President of the Euthanasia
Society of America, advocates euthanasia in other areas where
error in diagnosis and prospect of new relief or cures are much
reduced-that is, for the 'congenitally unfit'. 86 In large part for
the same reasons, Great Britain's Dr A. Leslie Banks, then Principal
Medical Officer of the Ministry of Health, maintained that a better case could be made for the destruction of congenital idiots and
those in the final stages of dementia, particularly senile dementia,
than could be made for the doing away of the pain-stricken
incurable. 31 Surely, such opponents of voluntary euthanasia cannot be accused of wrapping theological objections in medical
dressing!
g8
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Until the Euthanasia Societies of Great Britain and America
had been organized and a party decision reached, shall we say, to
advocate euthanasia only for incurables on their request, Dr Abraham L. Wolbarst, one of the most ardent supporters of the movement, was less troubled about putting away 'insane or defective
people [who] have suffered mental incapacity and tortures of the
mind for many years' than he was about the 'incurables'.88 He recognized the 'difficulty involved in the decision as to incurability'
as one of the 'doubtful aspects of euthanasia' : 'Doctors are only
human beings, with few if any supermen among them. They make
honest mistakes, like other men, because of the limitations of the
human mind.' 89
He noted further that 'it goes without saying that, in recently
developed cases with a possibility of cure, euthanasia should not
even be considered', that 'the law might establish a limit of, say,
ten years in which there is a chance of the patient's recovery'.'°
Dr Benjamin Miller is another who is unlikely to harbour an
ulterior theological motive. His interest is more personal. He him-self was left to die the death of a 'hopeless' tuberculosis victim,
only to discover that he was suffering from a rare malady which
affects the lungs in much the same manner but seldom kills. Five
years and sixteen hospitalizations later, Dr Miller dramatized his
point by recalling the last diagnostic clinic of the brilliant Richard
Cabot, on the occasion of his official retirement :
He was given the case records [complete medical histories and
results of careful examinations] of two patients and asked to
diagnose their illnesses. . . . The patients had died and only the
hospital pathologist knew the exact diagnosis beyond doubt,
for he had seen the descriptions of the postmortem findings. Dr
Cabot, usually very accurate in his diagnosis, that day missed
both.
The chief pathologist who had selected the cases was a wise
person. He had purposely chosen two of the most deceptive to
remind the medical students and young physicians that even at
the end of a long and rich experience one of the greatest diagnosticians of our time was still not infallible.•1
.,f<R.ichard Cabot was the John W. Davis, the John Lord O'Brian,
of his profession. When one reads the account of his last clinic,
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one cannot help but think of how fallible the average general practitioner must be, how fallible the young doctor just starting practice must be-and this, of course, is all that some small communities have in the way of medical care-how fallible the worst
practitioner, young or old, must be. If the range of skill and judgment among licensed physicians approaches the wide gap between
the very best and the very worst members of the bar-and I have
no reason to think it does not-then the minimally competent physician is hardly the man to be given the responsibility for ending
another's life. 4 2/Yet, under Williams's proposal at least, the marginal physician, as well as his more distinguished brethren, would
have legal authorization to make just such decisions. Under Williams's proposal, euthanatizing a patient or two would all be part
of the routine day's work.
Perhaps it is not amiss to add as a final note, that no less a
euthanasiast than Dr C. Killick Millard 43 had such little faith in
the averge general practitioner that as regards the mere administering of the coup de grace, he observed :

In order to prevent any likelihood of bungling, it would be very
necessary that only medical practitioners who had been specially
licensed to euthanize (after acquiring special knowledge and
skill) should be allowed to administer euthanasia. Quite possibly,
the work would largely be left in the hands of the official euthanizors who would have to be appointed specially for each area. 44
\ True, the percentage of correct diagnosis is particularly high
in cancer.•~ The short answer, however, is that euthanasiasts most
emphatically do not propose to restrict mercy-killing to cancer
cases. Dr Millard has maintained that 'there are very many diseases
besides cancer which tend to kill ''by inches", and where death,
when it does at last come to the rescue, is brought about by pain
and exhaustion'. 46 Furthermore, even if mercy-killings were to be
limited to cancer, however relatively accurate the diagnosis in
these cases, here, too, 'incurability of a disease is never more than
an estimate based upon experience, and how fallacious experience
may be in medicine only those who have had a great deal of
experience fully realize'. 47 /
Dr Daniel Laszlo, Chief of Division of Neoplastic Diseases,
IOO
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Montefiore Hospital, New York City, and three other physicians
have observed :
.~The mass crowding of a group of patients labeled 'terminal' in
· institutions designated for that kind of care carries a grave danger. The experience gathered from this group makes it seem reasonable to conclude that a fresh evaluation of any large group
in mental institutions, in institutions for chronic care, or in
homes for the incurably sick, would unearth a rewarding number of salvageable patients who can be returned to their normal
place in society.... For purposes of this study we were especially
interested in those with a diagnosis of advanced cancer. In a
number of these patients, major errors in diagnosis or management were encountered. 48 I
Faulty diagnosis is only one ground for error. Even if the diag:-'
nosis is correct, a second ground for error lies in the possibility \
that some measure of relief, if not a full cure, may come to the
fore within the life expectancy of the patient. Since Glanville Williams does not deign this objection to euthanasia worth more than
a passing reference,411 it is necessary to turn elsewhere to ascertain
how it has been met. One answer is: 'It must be little comfort to
a man slowly coming apart from multiple sclerosis to think that
fifteen years from now, death might not be his only hope.' 50
To state the problem this way is of course, to avoid it entirely.
How do we know that fifteen days or fifteen hours from now, 'death
might not be [the incurable's] only hope'?
A second answer is : '[N]o cure for cancer which might be found
"tomorrow" would be of any value to a man or woman "so far
advanced in cancerous toxemia as to be an applicant for
euthanasia" .' 51
As I shall endeavour to show, this approach is a good deal easier
to formulate than it is to apply. For one thing, it presumes that
we know today what cures will be found tomorrow. For another,
it overlooks that if such cases can be said to exist, the patient is
likely to be so far advanced in cancerous toxemia as to be no longer capable of understanding the step he is taking and hence beyond the stage when euthanasia ought to be administered. 52
,,,.. Thirty-six years ago, Dr Haven Emerson, then President of the
American Public Health Association, made the point that 'no one
IOI
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can say today what will be incurable tomorrow. No one can predict what disease will be fatal or permanently incurable until medicine becomes stationary and sterile'. Dr Emerson went so far as to
say that 'to be at all accurate we must drop altogether the term
"incurables" and substitute for it some such term as "chronic
illness" '.58
At that time Dr Emerson did not have to go back more than a
decade to document his contention. Before Banting and Best's
insulin discovery, many a diabetic had been doomed. Before the
Whipple-Minot-Murphy liver treatment made it a relatively minor
malady, many a pernicious anaemia sufferer had been branded
'hopeless'. Before the uses of sulphanilomide were disclosed, a
patient with widespread streptococcal blood-poisoning was a condemned man. 54 /
Today, we may· take even that most resolute disease, cancer,
and we need look back no further than the last two decades of
research in this field to document the same contention.55 True,
many types of cancer still run their course virtually unhampered
by man's arduous efforts to inhibit them. But the number of cancers coming under some control is ever increasing. With medicine
attacking on so many fronts with so many weapons, who would
bet a man's life on when and how the next type of cancer will
yield, if only just a bit? Of course, we would not be betting much
of a life. For even in those areas where gains have been registered,
the life is not 'saved', death is only postponed. In a sense this is
the case with every 'cure' for every ailmentililBut it may be urged
that, after all, there is a great deal of difference between the typical 'cure' which achieves an indefinite postponement, more or less,
and the cancer respite which results in only a brief intermission,
so to speak, of rarely more than six months or a year. Is this really
long enough to warrant all the bother?
Well, how long is long enough? In many recent cases of cancer respite, the patient, though experiencing only temporary relief,
underwent sufficient improvement to retake his place in society.
Six or twelve or eighteen months is long enough to do most of the
things which socially justify our existence, is it not? Long enough
for a nurse to care for more patients, a teacher to impart learning
to more classes, a judge to write a great opinion, a novelist to
write a stimulating book, a scientist to make an important dis102
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covery and, after all, for a factory-hand to put the wheels on
another year's Cadillac.

D. 'MISTAKES ARE ALWAYS POSSIBLE'

Under Professor Williams's 'legislative suggestion' a doctor could
'refrain from taking steps to prolong the patient's life by medical
means' solely on his own authority. Only when disposition by
affirmative 'mercy-killing' is a considered alternative, need he do
so much as, and only so much as, consult another general practitioner. 58 There are no other safeguards: no 'euthanasia referee'
no requirement that death be administered in the presence of an
official witness, as in the British Society's bill; no court to petition,
no committee to investigate and report back to the court, as in the
American Society's bill. Professor Williams's view is:
It may be allowed that mistakes are always possible, but this is
so in any of the affairs of life. And it is just as possible to make
a mistake by doing nothing as by acting. All that can be expected of any moral agent is that he should do his best on the
facts as they appear to him. 57
That mistakes are always possible, that mistakes are always
made, does not, it is true, deter society from pursuing a particular
line of conduct-if the line of conduct is compelled by needs which
override the risk of mistake. A thousand Convicting the Innocent's58 or Not Guilty's59 may stir us, may spur us to improve the
administration of the criminal law, but they cannot and should
not bring the business of deterring and incapacitating dangerous
criminals or would-be dangerous criminals to an abrupt and complete halt.
A relevant question, then, is what is the need for euthanasia
which leads us to tolerate the mistakes, the very fatal mistakes,
which will inevitably occur? What is the compelling force which
requires us to tinker with deeply entrenched and almost universal
precepts of criminal law?
Let us first examine the qualitative need for euthanasia.
J Proponents of euthanasia like to present for consideration the
case of the surgical operation, particularly a highly dangerous one :
risk of death is substantial, perhaps even more probable than not;
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in addition, there is always the risk that the doctors have misjudged
the situation and that no operation was needed at all. Yet it is
not unlawful to perform the operation.
The short answer is the witticism that whatever the incidence
of death in connection with different types of operations, 'no
doubt, it is in all cases below 100 per cent, which is the incidence
rate for euthanasia'.60 But this may not be the full answer. There
are occasions where the law permits action involving about a 100
per cent incidence of death-for example, self-defence. There may
well be other instances where the law should condone such actionfor example, the 'necessity' cases illustrated by the overcrowded
lifeboat, 61 the starving survivors of a shipwreck62 and-perhaps
best of all-by Professor Lon Fuller's penetrating and fascinating
tale of the trapped cave explorers.63
In all these situations, death for some may well be excused, if
not justified, yet the prospect that some deaths will be unnecessary
is a real one. He who kills in self-defence may have misjudged the
facts. They who throw passengers overboard to lighten the load
may no sooner do so than see 'masts and sails of rescue ... emerge
out of the fog' .64 But no human being will ever find himself in a
situation where he knows for an absolute certainty that one or
several must die that he or others may live. 'Modern legal systems . . . do not require divine knowledge of human beings.' 65
~easonable mistakes, then, may be tolerated if, as in the above
circumstances and as in the case of the surgical operation, these
mistakes are the inevitable by-products of efforts to save one or
more human lives.66
The need the euthanasiast advances, however, is a good deal less
compelling. It is only to ease pain. I
Let us next examine the quantitative need for euthanasia.
....No figures are available, so far as I can determine, as to the
number of, say, cancer victims, who undergo intolerable or overwhelming pain. That an appreciable number do suffer such pain,
I have no doubt. But that anything approaching this number whatever it is, need suffer such pain, I have-viewing the many sundry
palliative measures now available-considerable doubt. The whole
field of severe pain and its management in the terminal stage of
cancer is, according to an eminent physician, 'a subject neglected
far too much by the medical profession'. 67 Other well-qualified
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commentators have recently noted the 'obvious lack of interest in
the literature about the problem of cancer pain' 68 and have scored
'the deplorable attitude of defeatism and therapeutic inactivity
found in some quarters'. 69)
4The picture of the advanced cancer victim beyond the relief of
morphine and like drugs is a poignant one, but apparently no small ·
number of these situations may have been brought about by premature or excessive application of these drugs. Psychotherapy 'unfortunately . . . has barely been explored' 70 in this area, although
a survey conducted on approximately three hundred patients with
advanced cancer disclosed that 'over 50 per cent of patients who
had received analgesics for long periods of time could be adequately
controlled by placebo medication'. 71 Nor should it be overlooked
that nowadays drugs are only one of many ways-and by no means
always the most effective way-of attacking the pain problem.
Radiation, Rontgen and X-ray therapy; the administration of
various endocrine substances; intrathecal alcohol injections and
other types of nerve blocking; and various neurosurgical operations such as spinothalmic chordotomy and spinothalmic tractomy,
have all furnished striking relief in many cases. These various
formidable non-narcotic measures, it should be added, are conspicuously absent from the prolific writings of the euthanasiasts. /
,'( That of those who do suffer and must necessarily suffer the requisite pain, many really desire death, I have considerable doubt. 72
Further, that of those who may desire death at a given moment,
many have a fixed and rational desire for death, I likewise have
considerable doubt. Finally, taking those who may have such a
desire, again I must register a strong note of scepticism that many
cannot do the job themselves. 73 It is not that I condone suicide.
It is simply that I find it easier to prefer a laissez-faire approach
in such matters over an approach aided and sanctioned by the
state./
The need is only one variable. The incidence of mistake is
another. Can it not be said that although the need is not very
great it is great enough to outweigh the few mistakes which are
likely to occur? I think not. The incidence of error may be small
in euthanasia, but as I have endeavoured to show, and as Professor Williams has not taken pains to deny, under our present state
of knowledge appreciable error is inevitable.

,(7
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Even if the need for voluntary euthanasia could be said to outweigh the risk of mistake, this is not the end of the matter. That
'all that can be expected of any moral agent is that he should
do his best on the facts as they appear to him' 74 may be true as
far as it goes, but it would seem that where the consequence of
error is so irreparable it is not too much to expect of society that
there be a good deal more than one moral agent 'to do his best on
the facts as they appear to him'.

2.

A Long-range View of Euthanasia

A. VOLUNTARY VERSUS INVOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA

Ever since the 1870s, when what was probably the first euthanasia
debate of the modern era took place, 75 most proponents of the
movement-at least when they are pressed-have taken considerable pains to restrict the question to the plight of the unbearably
suffering incurable who voluntarily seeks death, while most of their
opponents have striven equally hard to frame the issue in terms
which would encompass certain involuntary situations as well, e.g.
the 'congenital idiots', the 'permanently insane', and the senile.
Glanville Williams reflects the outward mood of many euthanasiasts when he scores those who insist on considering the question
from a broader angle :
The [British Society's] bill [debated in the House of Lords in
1936 and 1950) excluded any question of compulsory euthanasia,
even for hopelessly defective infants. Unfortunately, a legislative
proposal is not assured of success merely because it is worded in
a studiously moderate and restrictive form. The method of
attack, by those who dislike the proposal, is .to use the 'thin
end of the wedge' argument. . . . There is no proposal for reform on any topic, however conciliatory and moderate, that
cannot be opposed by this dialectic. 76

Why was the bill 'worded in a studiously moderate and restrictive form'? If it were done as a matter of principle, if it were
done in recognition of the ethico-moral-legal 'wall of separation'
which stands between voluntary and compulsory 'mercy-killings',
much can be said for the euthanasiasts' lament about the methods
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employed by the opposition. But if it were done as a matter of
political expediency-with great hopes and expectations of pushing through a second and somewhat less restrictive bill as soon as
the first one had sufficiently 'educated' public opinion and next a
third, still less restrictive bill-what standing do the euthanasiasts
then have to attack the methods of the opposition? No cry of
righteous indignation could ring more hollow, I would think, than
the protest from those utilizing the 'wedge' principle themselves
that their opponents are making the wedge objection.
In this regard the words and action of the euthanasiasts are
not insignificant.
In the 1936 debate in the House of Lords, Lord Ponsonby of
Shulbrede, who moved the second reading of the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill, described two appealing actual cases, one where a man
drowned his four-year-old daughter 'who had contracted tuberculosis and had developed gangrene in the face', 77 and another where
a woman killed her mother who was suffering from 'general paralysis of the insane'. 78 Both cases of course were of the compulsory
variety of euthanasia. True, Lord Ponsonby readily admitted that
these cases were not covered by the proposed bill, but the fact remains that they were the only specific cases he chose to describe.
In 1950, Lord Chorley once again called the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill to the attention of the House of Lords. He was most
articulate, if not too discreet, on excluding compulsory euthanasia
cases from coverage :
... Another objection is that the Bill does not go far enough,
because it applies only to adults and does not apply to children
who come into the world deaf, dumb and crippled, and who
have a much better cause than those for whom the Bill provides.
That may be so, but we must go step by step. 79
In 1938, two years after the British Society was organized and its
bill had been introduced into the House of Lords, the Euthanasia
Society of America was formed. 80 At its first annual meeting the
following year, it offered proposed euthanasia legislation:
Infant imbeciles, hopelessly insane persons . . . and any person
not requesting his own death would not come within the scope
of the proposed act. Charles E. Nixdorf£, New York lawyer and
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treasurer of the society, who offered the bill for consideration,
explained to some of the members who desired to broaden the
soope of the proposed law, that it was limited purposely to voluntary euthanasia because public opinion is not ready to accept
the broader principle. He said, however, that the society hoped
eventually to legalize the putting to death of nonvolunteers beyond the help of medical science. 81

At a meeting of the Society of Medical Jurisprudence held
several weeks after the American Society's Voluntary Euthanasia
Bill had been drafted, Dr Foster Kennedy, newly elected President of the Society, urged 'the legalizing of euthanasia primarily
in cases of born defectives who are doomed to remain defective,
rather than for normal persons who have become miserable
through incurable illness' and scored the 'absurd and misplaced
sentimental kindness' that seeks to preserve the life of a 'person
who is not a person'. 'If the law rought to restrict euthanasia to
those who could speak out for it, and thus overlooked these creatures who cannot speak, then, I say as Dickens did, "The law's an
ass".' 82 As pointed out elsewhere, while President of the Society,
Dr Kennedy not only eloquently advocated involuntary euthanasia but strenuously opposed the voluntary variety. 83 Is it any wonder that opponents of the movement do not always respect the
voluntary-involuntary dichotomy?
In 1950, the 'mercy-killings' perpetrated by Dr Herman N.
Sander on his cancer-stricken patient and by Miss Carol Ann Paight
on her cancer-stricken father put the euthanasia question on page
one. 84 In the midst of the fervour over these cases, Dr Clarence
Cook Little, one of the leaders in the movement and a former
President of the American Society, suggested specific safeguards
for a law legalizing 'mercy-killings' for the 'incurably ill but mentally fit' and for 'mental defectives'. 83 The Reverend Charles Francis Potter, the founder and first president of the American Society,
hailed Dr Sander's action as 'morally right' and hence that which
'should be legally right'. 86 Shortly thereafter, at its annual meeting,
the American Society 'voted to continue support' of both Dr Sander and Miss Paight. 87
Now, one of the interesting, albeit underplayed, features of these
cases--and this was evident all along-was that both were involuntary 'mercy-killings'. There was considerable conflict in the testi108
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mony at the Sander Trial as to whether or not the victim's husband
had pleaded with the doctor to end her suffering, 88 but nobody
claimed that the victim herself had done such pleading. There
was considerable evidence in the Paight case to the effect that the
victim's daughter had a 'cancer phobia', the cancer deaths of two
aunts having left a deep mark on her, 89 but nobody suggested that
the victim had a 'cancer phobia'.
It is true that Mother Paight said approvingly of her mercykilling daughter that 'she had the old Paight guts', 90 but it is no
less true that Father Paight had no opportunity to pass judgment
on the question. He was asleep, still under the anaesthetic of the
exploratory operation which revealed the cancer in his stomach
when his daughter, after having taken one practice shot in the
woods, fired into his left temple. 91 Is it not just possible that Father
Paight would have preferred to have had the vaunted Paight intestinal fortitude channelled in other directions, e.g. by his daughter bearing to see him suffer ?92
The Sander and Paight cases amply demonstrate that to the
press, the public, and many euthanasiasts, the killing of one who
does not or cannot speak is no less a 'mercy-killing' than the killing
of one who asks for death. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of
known or alleged 'mercy-killings' have occurred without the consent of the victim. If the Sander and Paight cases are typical at
all, they are so only in that the victims were not ill or retarded
children, as in the Simpson, 93 Brownhill94 and Long93 English
cases, and the Greenfield, Repouille, Noxon and Braunsdorf
American cases.96
These situations are all quite moving. So much so that two of
the strongest presentations of the need for voluntary euthanasia,
free copies of which may be obtained from the American Society,
lead off with sympathetic discussions of the Brownhill and Greenfield cases. 97 This, it need hardly be said, is not the way to honour
the voluntary-involuntary boundary; not the way to ease the pressure to legalize at least this type of involuntary euthanasia as
well, if any changes in the broad area are to be made at all.
Nor, it should be noted, is Williams free from criticism in this
regard. In his discussion of 'the present law', apparently a discussion of voluntary euthanasia, he cites only one case, Simpson, an
involuntary situation. 98 In his section on 'the administration of the
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law' he describes only the Sander case and the 'compassionate
acquittal' of a man who drowned his four-year-old daughter, a
sufferer of tuberculosis and gangrene of the face. 99 Again, both are
involuntary cases. For 'some other' American mercy-killing cases,
Williams refers generally to an article by Helen Silving,100 but two
of the three cases he seems to have in mind are likewise cases of
involuntary euthanasia. 101
That the press and general public are not alone in viewing an
act as a 'mercy-killing', lack of consent on the part of the victim
notwithstanding, is well evidenced by the deliberations of the Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment. 102 The report itself described
'mercy-killings' as 'for example, where a mother has killed her
child or a husband has killed his wife from merciful motives of pi:ty
and humanity'.103 The only specific proposal to exclude 'mercykillings' from the category of murder discussed in the report is a
suggestion by the Society of Labour Lawyers which disregards the
voluntary-involuntary distinction :
If a person who has killed another person proves that he killed
that person with the compassionate intention of saving him
physical or mental suffering, he shall not be guilty of murder. 10 '

Another proposal, one by Hector Hughes, M.P., to the effect
that only those who 'maliciously' cause the death of another shall
be guilty of murder,103 likewise treated the voluntary and involuntary 'mercy-killer' as one and the same.
Testimony before the Commission underscored the great appeal
of the involuntary 'mercy-killings.' Thus, Lord Goddard, the Lord
Chief Justice, referred to the famous Brownhill case, which he
himself had tried some fifteen years earlier, as 'a dreadfully pathetic case' .106 'The son,' he pointed out, 'was a hopeless imbecile,
more than imbecile, a mindless idiot.' 101
Mr Justice Humphreys recalled 'one case that was the most
pathetic sight I ever saw',1° 8 a case which literally had the trial
judge, Mr Justice Hawkins, in tears. It involved a young father
who smothered his infant child to death when he learned the child
had contracted syphilis from the mother (whose morals turned out
to be something less than represented) and would be blind for life.
'That,' Mr Justice Humphreys told the Commission, 'was a real
"mercy-killing'' .' 109
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The boldness and daring which characterize most of Glanville
Williams's book dim perceptibly when he comes to involuntary
euthanasia proposals. As to the senile, he states :
At present the problem has certainly not reached the degree of
seriousness that would warrant an effort being made to change
traditional attitudes towards the sanctity of life of the aged. Only
the grimmest necessity could bring about a change that, however
cautious in its approach, would probably cause apprehension
and deep distress to many people, and inflict a traumatic injury
upon the accepted code of behaviour built up by two thousand
years of the Christian religion. It may be, however, that as the
problem becomes more acute it will itself cause a reversal of
generally accepted values.l1°
To me, this passage is the most startling one in the book. On
page 310 Williams invokes 'traditional attitudes towards the sanctity of life' and 'the accepted code of behaviour built up by two
thousand years of the Christian religion' to check the extension of
euthanasia to the senile, but for 309 pages he had been merrily
rolling along debunking both. Substitute 'cancer victim' for 'the
aged' and Williams's passage is essentially the argument of many
of his opponents on the voluntary euthanasia question.
The unsupported comment that 'the problem [of senility] has
certainly not reached the degree of seriousness' to warrant euthanasia is also rather puzzling, particularly coming as it does after an
observation by Williams on the immediately preceding page that
'it is increasingly common for men and women to reach an age of
"second childishness and mere oblivion", with a loss of almost all
adult faculties except that of digestion'. 111
How 'serious' does a problem have to be to warrant a change in
these 'traditional attitudes'? If, as the statement seems to indicate,
'seriousness' of the problem is to be determined numerically, the
problem of the cancer victim does not appear to be as substantial
as the problem of the senile. For example, taking just the 95,837
first admissions to 'public prolonged-care hospitals' for mental
diseases in the United States in 1955, 23,561-or one-fourthwere cerebral arteriosclerosis or senile brain disease cases. I am
not at all sure that there are twenty thousand cancer victims per
year who die unbearably painful deaths. Even if there were, I
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cannot believe that among their ranks are some twenty thousand
per year who, when still in a rational state, so long for a quick and
easy death that they would avail themselves of legal machinery for
euthanasia.
If the problem of the incurable cancer victim has reached 'the
degree of seriousness that would warrant an effort being made to
change traditional attitudes towards the sanctity of life', as Williams obviously thinks it has, then so has the problem of senility.
In any event, the senility problem will undoubtedly soon reach even
Williams's requisite degree of seriousness:
A decision concerning the senile may have to be taken within
the next twenty years. The number of old people are increasing
by leaps and bounds. Pneumonia, 'the old man's friend', is now
checked by antibiotics. The effects of hardship, exposure, starvation and accident are now minimized. Where is this leading
us? ... What of the drooling, helpless, disorientated old man or
the doubly incontinent old woman lying log-like in bed? Is it
here that the real need for euthanasia exists ?112
If, as Williams indicates, 'seriousness' of the problem is a major
criterion for euthanatizing a category of unfortunates, the sum
total of mentally deficient persons would appear to warrant high
priority, indeed.118
When Williams turns to the plight of the 'hopelessly defective
infants', his characteristic vim and vigour are, as in the senility
discussion, conspicuously absent :

While the Euthanasia Society of England has never advocated
this, the Euthanasia Society of America did include it in its
original programme. The proposal certainly escapes the chief
objection to the similar proposal for senile dementia: it does not
create a sense of insecurity in society, because infants cannot,
like adults, feel anticipatory dread of being done to death if
their condition should worsen. Moreover, the proposal receives
some support on eugenic grounds, and more importantly on
humanitarian grounds-both on account of the parents, to whom
the child will be a burden all their lives, and on account of the
handicapped child itself. (It is not, however, proposed that any
child should be destroyed against the wishes of its parents.)
Finally, the legalization of euthanasia for handicapped children
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would bring the law into closer relation to its practical administration, because juries do not regard parental mercy-killing as
murder. For these various reasons the proposal to legalize
humanitarian infanticide is put forward from time to time by
individuals. They remain in a very small minority, and the proposal may at present be dismissed as politically insignificant.11 4
It is understandable for a reformer to limit his present proposals
for change to those with a real prospect of success. But it is hardly
reassuring for Williams to cite the fact that only 'a very small
minority' has urged euthanasia for 'hopelessly defective infants' as
the only reason for not pressing for such legislation now. If, as
Williams sees it, the only advantage voluntary euthanasia has over
the involuntary variety lies in the organized movements on its
behalf, that advantage can readily be wiped out.
In any event, I do not think that such 'a very small minority'
has advocated 'humanitarian infanticide'. Until the organization
of the British and American societies led to a concentration on the
voluntary type, and until the by-products of the Nazi euthanasia
programme somewhat embarrassed, if only temporarily, most proponents of involuntary euthanasia, about as many writers urged
one type as another.11 5 Indeed, some euthanasiasts have taken considerable pains to demonstrate the superiority of defective infant
euthanasia over incurably ill euthanasia.U 6
As for dismissing euthanasia of defective infants as 'politically
insignificant', the only poll that I know of which measured the
public response to both types of euthanasia revealed that 45 per
cent favoured euthanasia for defective infants under certain conditions while only 37.3 per cent approved euthanasia for the incurably and painfully ill under any conditions. 117 Furthermore, of
those who favoured the mercy-killing cure for incurable adults,
some 40 per cent would require only family permission or medical
board approval, but not the patient's permission.11 8
Nor do I think it irrelevant that while public resistance caused
Hitler to yield on the adult euthanasia front, the killing of malformed and idiot children continued unhindered to the end of the
war, the definition of 'children' expanding all the while. 119 Is it the
embarrassing experience of the Nazi euthanasia programme which
has rendered destruction of defective infants presently 'politically
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insignificant'? If so, is it any more of a jump for the incurably and
painfully ill to the unorthodox political thinker than it is from
the hopelessly defective infant to the same 'unsavoury character'?
Or is it not so much that the euthanasiasts are troubled by the Nazi
experience as it is that they are troubled that the public is troubled
by the Nazi experience?
I read Williams's comments on defective infants for the proposition that there are some very good reasons for euthanatizing defective infants, but the time is not yet ripe. When will it be? When
will the proposal become politically significant? After a voluntary
euthanasia law is on the books and public opinion is sufficiently
'educated'?
Williams's reasons for not extending euthanasia-once we legalize it in the narrow 'voluntary' area-to the senile and the defective
are much less forceful and much less persuasive than his arguments for legalizing voluntary euthanasia in the first place. I regard
this as another reason for not legalizing voluntary euthanasia in
the first place.

B. THE PARADE OF HORRORS

'Look, when the messenger cometh, shut the door, and hold him
fast at the door: is not the sound of his master's feet behind
him?'l20
This is the 'wedge principle', the 'parade of horrors' objection,
if you will, to voluntary euthanasia. Glanville Williams's peremptory
retort is:
This use of the 'wedge' objection evidently involves a particular
determination as to the meaning of words, namely the words
'if raised to a general line of conduct'. The author supposes, for
the sake of argument, that the merciful extinction of life in a
suffering patient is not in itself immoral. Still it is immoral, because if it were permitted this would admit 'a most dangerous
wedge that might eventually put all life in a precarious condition'. It seems a sufficient reply to say that this type of reasoning could be used to condemn any act whatever, because there is
no human conduct from which evil cannot be imagined to follow
if it is persisted in when some of the circumstances are changed.
All moral questions involve the drawing of a line, but the 'wedge
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principle' would make it impossible to draw a line, because the
line would have to be pushed farther and farther back until all
action became vetoed. 121
I agree with Williams that if a first step is 'moral' it is moral
wherever a second step may take us. The real point, however, the
point that Williams sloughs, is that whether or not the first step
is precarious, is perilous, is worth taking, rests in part on what the
second step is likely to be.
It is true that the 'wedge' objection can always be advanced,
the horrors can always be paraded. But it is no less true that on
some occasions the objection is much more valid than it is on
others. One reason why the 'parade of horrors' cannot be too lightly
dismissed in this particular instance is that Miss Voluntary Euthanasia is not likely to be going it alone for very long. Many of her
admirers, as I have endeavoured to show in the preceding section,
would be neither surprised nor distressed to see her joined by Miss
Euthanatize the Congenital Idiots and Miss Euthanatize the Permanently Insane and Miss Euthanatize the Senile Dementia. And
these lasses-whether or not they themselves constitute a 'parade
of horrors'-certainly make excellent majorettes for such a parade:
Some are proposing what is called euthanasia; at present only a
proposal for killing those who are a nuisance to themselves; but
soon to be applied to those who are a nuisance to other people. 122
Another reason why the 'parade of horrors' argument cannot
be too lightly dismissed in this particular instance, it seems to me,
is that the parade has taken place in our time and the order of
procession has been headed by the killing of the 'incurables' and
the 'useless' :
Even before the Nazis took open charge in Germany, a propaganda barrage was directed against the traditional compassionate
nineteenth-century attitudes toward the chronically ill, and for
the adoption of a utilitarian, Hegelian point of view. . . . Lay
opinion was not neglected in this campaign. Adults were propagandized by motion pictures, one of which, entitled 'I Accuse',
deals entirely with euthanasia. This film depicts the life history
of a woman suffering from multiple sclerosis; in it her husband,
a doctor, finally kills her to the accompaniment of soft piano
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music rendered by a sympathetic colleague in an adjoining
room. Acceptance of this ideology was implanted even in the
children. A widely used high-school mathematics text . . . included problems stated in distorted terms of the cost of caring
for and rehabilitating the chronically sick and crippled. One of
the problems asked, for instance, how many new housing units
could be built and how many marriage-allowance loans could
be given to newly wedded couples for the amount of money it
cost the state to care for 'the crippled, the criminal and the insane... .' The beginnings at first were merely a subtle shift in
emphasis in the basic attitude of the physicians. It started with the
acceptance of the attitude, basic in the euthanasia movement,
that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be lived. This
attitude in its early stages concerned itself merely with the
severely and chronically sick. Gradually the sphere of those to
be included in this category was enlarged to encompass the
socially unproductive, the ideologically unwanted, the racially
unwanted and finally all non-Germans. But it is important to
realize that the infinitely small wedged-in lever from which this
entire trend of mind received its impetus was the attitude toward
the non-rehabilitatable sick. 123
The apparent innocuousness of Germany's 'small beginnings' is perhaps best shown by the fact that German Jews were at first excluded from the programme. For it was originally conceived that
'the blessing of euthanasia should be granted only to [true] Germans•.124
Relatively early in the German programme, Pastor Braune,
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Domestic Welfare
Council of the German Protestant Church, called for a halt to
euthanasia measures 'since they strike sharply at the moral foundations of the nation as a whole. The inviolability of human life is
a pillar of any social order'. 125 And the pastor raised the same question which euthanasia opponents ask today, as well they might,
considering the disinclination of many in the movement to stop at
voluntary 'mercy-killings' : Where do we, how do we, draw the
line? The good pastor asked :
How far is the destruction of socially unfit life to go? The massmethods used so far have quite evidently taken in many people
who are to a considerable degree of sound mind.
• Is it in-
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tended to strike only at the utterly hopeless cases-the idiots
and imbeciles? The instruction sheet, as already mentioned, also
lists senile diseases. The latest decree by the same authorities requires that children with serious congenital disease and malformation of every kind be registered, to be collected and processed in special institutions. This necessarily gives rise to grave
apprehensions. Will a line be drawn at the tubercular? In the
case of perwns in custody by court order, euthanasia measures
have evidently already been initiated. Are other abnormal or
anti-social persons likewise to be included? Where is the borderline? Who is abnormal, anti-social, hopelessly sick ?128
Williams makes no attempt to distinguish or minimize the Nazi
Germany experience. Apparently he does not consider it worthy of
mention in a euthanasia discussion.

A Final Reflection
There have been and there will continue to be compelling circumstances -when a doctor or relative or friend will violate The Law
on the Books and, more often than not, receive protection from
The Law in Action. But this is not to deny that there are other
occasions when The Law on the Books operates to stay the hand
of all concerned, among them situations where the patient is in
fact (1) presently incurable, (2) beyond the aid of any respite which
may come along in his life expectancy, suffering (3) intolerable and
(4) unmitigable pain and of a (5) fixed and (6) rational desire to
die. That any euthanasia programme may only be the opening
wedge for far more objectionable practices, and that even within
the bounds of a 'voluntary' plan such as Williams's the incidence
of mistake or abuse is likely to be substantial, are not much solace
to one in the above plight.
It may be conceded that in a narrow sense it is an 'evil' for such
a patient to have to continue to suffer-if only for a little while.
But in a narrow sense, long-term sentences and capital punishment are 'evils', too. 127 If we can justify the infliction of imprison-'
ment and death by the state 'on the ground of the social interests
to be protected', then surely we can similarly justify the postponement of death by the state. The objection that the individual is-
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thereby
further
Holmes
himself

treated not as an 'end' in himself but only as a 'means' to
the common good was, I think, aptly disposed of by
long ago: 'If a man lives in society, he is likely to find
so treated.' 128
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lesser degree of criminal homicide. If mercy-killings were simply taken out
of the category of murder, a second line of defence might well be the
appearance of a mercy-killing, but in planned murders generally the primary concern of the murderer must surely be to escape all punishment
whatever, not to give a serious, but not the most serious, appearance to his
act, not to substitute a long period of imprisonment for execution. Cf. the
discussion of faked suicide pacts in the Royal Commission findings, op. cit.,
Minutes of Evidence, paras 804-7. This paper deals with proposals to
legalize 'mercy-killing' completely, not with the advisability of removing it
from the category of murder.
13
House of Lords Debates, 103, 5th series (1936), cols. 484-5.
14
Banks, 'Euthanasia', General Practitioner, 161 (1948), 101, 104.
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1a 'The promoters of the bill hoped that they might be able to mollify
the opposition by providing stringent safeguards. Now, they were right in
thinking that if they had put in no safeguards-if they had merely said
that a doctor could kill his patient whenever he thought it right-they
would have been passionately opposed on this ground. So they put in the
safeguards. . . . Did the opposition like these elaborate safeguards? On the
contrary, they made them a matter of complaint. The safeguards would, it
was said, bring too much formality into the sick-room, and destroy the relationship between doctor and patient. So the safeguards were wrong, but not
one of the opposition speakers said that he would have voted for the bill
without the safeguards.' (Williams, p. 298)
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Id., pp. 302 ff. The desire to give doctors a free hand is expressed
passim numerous times, e.g.: '[T]here should be no formalities and . . .
everything should be left to the discretion of the doctor.' (p. 303) ' . . . the
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the proposed legislation to set doctors free from the fear of the law so that
they can think only of the relief of their patients.' (p. 305) 'It would bring
the whole subject within ordinary medical practice.' (Ibid.) Williams sug•
gests that the pertinent provisions might be worded as follows:
'1. For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that it shall be law•
ful for a physician whose patient is seriously ill . ·, . 'b. to refrain from
taking steps to prolong the patient's life by medical means; ... unless it
is proved that ... the omission was not made, in good faith for the pur•
pose of saving the patient from severe pain in an illness believed to be
of an incurable and fatal character.
'2. It shall be lawful for a physician, after consultation with another
physician, to accelerate by any merciful means the death of a patient
who is seriously ill, unless it is proved that the act was not done in good
faith with the consent of the patient and for the purpose of saving him
from severe pain in an illness believed to be of an incurable and fatal
character.' (p. 308)
The completely unrestricted authorization to kill by omission may well
be based on Williams's belief that, under existing law, '"mercy-killing" by
omission to prolong life is probably lawful' since the physician is 'probably
exempted' from the duty to use reasonable care to conserve his patient's
life 'if life has become a burden'. (p. 29 I) And he adds--as if this settles
the legal question-that 'the morality of an omission in these circumstances
is conceded by Catholics'. (Ibid.) If Williams means, as he seems to, that
once a doctor has undertaken treatment and the patient is entrusted solely
to his care he may sit by the bedside of the patient whose life has 'become
a burden' and let him die-e.g. by not replacing the oxygen bottle-I submit that he is quite mistaken.
The outer limits of criminal liability for inaction are hardly free from
doubt, but it seems fairly clear under existing law that the special and
traditional relationship of physician and patient imposes a 'legal duty to
act', particularly where the patient is helpless and completely dependent
on the physician, and that the physician who withholds life-preserving medical means of the type described above commits criminal homicide by omission. In this regard, see Burdick, Crimes, 2 (1946), § 466c; Hall, Principles of Criminal Law (1947), pp. 272-8; Kenny, Outlines of Criminal
Law (16th edn: Turner, 1952), pp. 14-15, 107-9; Perkins, Criminal Law
(1957), pp. 513-27; Russell, Crime, I (10th edn: Turner, 1950), pp. 449-66;
Hughes, 'Criminal Omissions', Yale Law Journal, 67 (1958), 590, 599-600,
621-6, 630 n. 142; Kirchheimer, 'Criminal Omissions', Harvard Law
Review, 55 (1942), 615, 625-8; Wechsler and Michael, op. cit. (n. 6 above),
724-5. Nor am I at all certain that the Catholics do 'concede' this point.
Williams's reference is to Sullivan, op. cit. (n. I I above), p. 64. But Sullivan considers therein what might be viewed as relatively remote and indirect omissions, e.g. whether to call in a very expensive specialist, whether
to undergo a very painful or very drastic operation.
The Catholic approach raises nice questions and draws fine lines, e.g.
how many limbs must be amputated before an operation is to be regarded
as non-obligatory 'extraordinary', as opposed to 'ordinary', means; but they
will not be dwelt upon herein. Suffice to say that apparently there has
never been an indictment, let alone a conviction, for a 'mercy-killing' by
omission, not even one which directly and immediately produces death.
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This, of course, is not to say that no such negative 'mercy-killings' have
ever occurred. There is reason to think that not too infrequently this is the
fate of the defective newborn infant. Williams simply asserts that the 'beneficient tendency of nature [in that 'monsters' usually die quickly after birth]
is assisted, in Britain at any rate, by the practice of doctors and nurses, who,
when an infant is born seriously malformed, do not "strive officiously to
keep alive"'. (p. 32) Fletcher makes a similar and likewise undocumented
observation that 'it has always been a quite common practice of midwives
and, in modern times doctors, simply to fail to respirate monstrous babies
at birth'. (op. cit [n. 2 above], p. 207 n. 54) A supposition to the same
effect was made twenty years earlier in Gregg, 'The Right to Kill', N.
American Review, 237 (1934), 239, 242. A noted obstetrician and gynaecologist, Dr Frederick Loomis, has told of occasions wflere expectant fathers
have, in effect, asked him to destroy the child, if born abnormal. (Loomis,
Consultation Room [1946], p. 53) For an eloquent presentation of the problem raised by the defective infant, see id., pp. 53-64.
It is difficult to discuss the consultation feature of Williams's proposal
for affirmative 'mercy-killing', because Williams himself never discusses it.
This fact, plus the fact that Williams's recurrent theme is to give the general
practitioner a free hand, indicates that he himself does not regard consultation as a significant feature of his plan. The attending physician need
only consult another general practitioner and there is no requirement that
there be any concurrence in his diagnosis. There is no requirement of a
written report. There is no indication as to what point in time there need
be consultation. Probably consultation would be thought necessary only in
regard to diagnosis of the disease and from that point in respect of the
extent and mitigatory nature of the pain, the firmness and rationality of
the desire to die to be judged solely by the attending physician. For the
view that even under rather elaborate consultation requirements, in many
thinly staffed communities the consultant doctor would merely reflect the
view of the attending physician, see 'Life and Death', Time Magazine
(March 13, 1950), p. 50. After reviewing eleven case-histories of patients
wrongly diagnosed as having advanced cancer--diagnoses that stood uncorrected over long periods of time and after several admissions at leading
hospitals--Drs Laszlo, Colmer, Silver and Standard conclude: '[I]t became
increasingly clear that the original error was one easily made, but that the
continuation of that error was due to an acceptance of the original data
without exploring their verity and completeness.' ('Errors in Diagnosis and
Management of Cancer', Annals of Internal Medicine, 33 [1950],
670)
20
In 1950 the General Assembly of the World Medical Association
approved a resolution recommending to all national associations that they
'condemn the practice of euthanasia under any circumstances'. (New York
Times [Oct. 18, 1950], p. 22) Earlier that year the Medical Society of the
State of New York went on record as being 'unalterably opposed to euthanasia and to any legislation which will legalize euthanasia'. (Ibid. [May 1 o,
1950], p. 29).
On the other hand, euthanasiasts claim their movement finds great support in the medical profession. The most impressive and most frequently
cited piece of evidence is the formation, in 1946, of a committee of 1,776
physicians for the legalization of voluntary euthanasia in New York:. (See
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Williams, p. 296; Fletcher, op. cit, [n. 2 above], p. 187) Williams states
that of 3,272 physicians who replied to a questionnaire in New York State
in 1946, 80 per cent approved voluntary euthanasia and the Committee
of 1,776 came from among this favourable group. I have been unable to
find any authority for the 80 per cent figure, and Williams cites none. Some
years ago, Gertrude Anne Edwards, then editor of the Euthanasia Society
Bulletin, claimed 3,272 physicians-apparently all who replied-favoured
legalizing voluntary euthanasia. (Edwards, 'Mercy Death for Incurables
Should Be Made Legal', Daily Compass [Aug. 24, 1949], p. 8) Presumably,
as in the case of the recent New Jersey questionnaire discussed below,
every physician in New York was sent a questionnaire. If so, then the
figure cited, whether Williams's or Edwards's, would mean a great deal
more (and support the euthanasiasts a great deal less) if it were added that
88 or 89 per cent of the physicians in the state did not reply at all. In 1940,
there were over 26,000 physicians in the State of New York (U.S. Dept of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census: The Labor Force, Pt 4, p. 366); and
in 1950 there were over 30,000 (id.: Characteristics of the Population, Pt
32, p. 260).
In 1957 a petition for legalized euthanasia was signed by 166 New Jersey physicians, urging in effect the adoption of the American Society's Bill.
(See Anderson, 'Who Signed for Euthanasia?', America, 96 [1957], 573)
About 98 per cent of the state medical profession declined to sign such a
petition. The Medical Society of New Jersey immediately issued a statement that 'euthanasia has been and continues to be in conflict with accepted
principles of morality and sound medical practice'. When their names were
published in a state newspaper, many of the 166 claimed they had not
signed the petition or that they had misunderstood its purpose or that,
unknown to them, it had been handled by a secretary as a routine matter.
21
It should be noted that under what might be termed the 'family plan'
feature of Williams's proposal, minors might be euthanatized too. Their
fate is to be 'left to the good sense of the doctor, taking into account, as he
always does, the wishes of parents as well as those of the child'. (Williams,
p. 303 n. 1) The dubious quality of the 'voluntariness' of euthanasia in
these circumstances need not be laboured.
22
Frohman, loc, cit. (n. 15 above).
2a The disturbing mental effects of morphine, 'the classic opiate for the
relief of severe pain' (Schiffrin and Gross, 'Systematic Analgetics', Management of Pain in Cancer [Schiffrin edn, 1956], p. 22), and 'still the most
commonly used potent narcotic analgesic in treatment of cancer pain'
(Bonica, 'The Management of Cancer Pain', General Practitioner [Nov.
1954], pp. 35, 39), have been described in considerable detail by Drs Wolff,
Hardy and Goodell in 'Studies on Pain: Measurement of the Effect of
Morphine, Codeine and Other Opiates on the Pain Threshold and an
Analysis of Their Relation to the Pain Experience', / ournal of Clinical Investigation, 19 (1940), 659, 664. The increasing use of ACTH or cortisone
therapy in cancer palliation presents further problems. Such therapy 'frequently' leads to a 'severe degree of disturbance in capacity for rational,
sequential thought'. (Lindemann and Clark, 'Modifications in Ego Structure
and Personality Reactions under the Influence of the Effects of Drugs',
American Journal of Psychiatry, 108 [1952], 561, 566)
:u Goodman and Gilman, The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics
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(2nd edn, 1955), p. 235. To the same effect is Seevers and Pfeiffer, 'A Study
of the Analgesia, Subjective Depression and Euphoria Produced by Morphine, Heroin, Dilaudid and Codeine in the Normal Human Subject',
Journal of Pharmacological and Experimental Therapy, 56 (1936), 166,
182, 187.
2s Sharpe, 'Medication as a Threat to Testamentary Capacity', N. Carolina Law Review, 35 (1957), 380, 392, and medical authorities cited therein. In the case of ACTH or cortisone therapy, the situation is complicated
by the fact that 'a frequent pattern of recovery' from psychoses induced by
such therapy is 'by the occurrence of lucid intervals of increasing frequency
and duration, punctuated by relapses in psychotic behavior'. (Clark et al.,
'Further Observations on Mental Disturbances Associated with Cortisone and
ACTH Therapy', New England Journal of Medicine, 249 [1953], 178, 183)
2&
Sharpe, op. cit., 384. Goodman and Gilman observe that while 'different individuals require varying periods of time before the repeated
administration of morphine results in tolerance ... as a rule ..• after about
two to three weeks of continued use of the same dose of alkaloid the usual
depressant effects fail to appear', whereupon 'phenomenally large doses may
be taken'. (Op. cit. [n. 24 above], p. 234) For a discussion of 'the nature
of addiction', see Maurer and Vogel, Narcotics and Narcotic Addiction
( I 954), pp. 20·3 I.
21
'Why I Oppose Mercy Killings', Woman's Home Companion CTune
1950), pp. 38, 103.
2s
House of Lords Debates, 103, 5th series (1936), cols 466, 492-3. To
the same effect is Lord Horder's speech in the 1950 debates (op. cit., 169,
5th series [1950], cols 551, 569). See also Gumpert, 'A False Mercy', The
Nation, 170 (1950), 80: 'Even the incapacitated, agonized patient in despair
most of the time, may still get some joy from existence. His mood will
change between longing for death and fear of death. Who would want to
decide what should be done on such unsafe ground?'
29
Williams, pp. 306-7.
30
Id., p. 307.1
81
Zarling, 'Psychological Aspects of Pain in Terminal Malignancies',
Management of Pain in Cancer (Schiffrin edn, 1956), pp. 211-12.
82
Id., pp. 213-14. See also Dr Benjamin Miller to the effect that cancer
'can be a "horrible experience" for the doctor too' and that 'a long, difficult illness may emotionally exhaust the relatives and physician even more
than the patient' (op. cit. [n. 27 above], p. 103); and Stephen, commenting
on the disclosure by a Dr Thwing that he had practised euthanasia: 'The
boldness of this avowal is made particularly conspicuous by Dr Thwing's
express admission that the only person for whom the lady's death,
if she had been allowed to die naturally, would have been in any degree
painful was not the lady herself, but Dr Thwing.' ('Murder from the Best
of Motives', Law Quarterly Review, 5 [1889], 188)
as Wechsler, 'The Issues of the Nuremburg Trial', Political Science Quarterly, 62 (1947), 11, 16. Cf. Cardozo, 'What Medicine Can Do for Law',
Law and Literature (1931), pp. 88-9: 'Punishment is necessary, indeed,
not only to deter the man who is a criminal at heart, who has felt the
criminal impulse, who is on the brink of indecision, but also to deter others
who in our existing social organization have never felt the criminal impulse
and shrink from crime in horror. Most of us have such a scorn and loathing of robbery or forgery that the temptation to rob or forge is never with123
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in the range of choice; it is never a real alternative. There can be little
doubt, however, that some of this repugnance is due to the ignominy that
has been attached to these and like offenses through the sanctions of the
criminal law. If the ignominy were withdrawn, the horror might be
dimmed.'
H
Williams, p. 283.
a5
Ibid.
36
'What to do with the hopelessly unfit? I had thought at a younger time
of my life that the legalizing of euthanasia-a soft gentle-sounding wordwas a thing to be encouraged; but as I pondered, and as my experience
in medicine grew, I became less sure. Now my face is set against the
legalization of euthanasia for any person, who, having been well, has at
last become ill, for however ill they be, many get well and help the world
for years after. But I am in favor of euthanasia for those hopeless ones who
should never have been born-Nature's mistakes. In this category it is,
with care and knowledge, impossible to be mistaken in either diagnosis or
prognosis.' (Kennedy, 'The Problem of Social Control of the Congenital
Defective', American Journal of Psychiatry, 99 [1942], 13, 14)
'We doctors do not always know when a disease in a previously healthy
person has become entirely incurable. But there are thousands and tens of
thousands of the congenitally unfit, about whom no diagnostic error would
be possible ... with nature's mistakes ... there can be, after five years •..
of life, no error in diagnosis, nor any hope of betterment.' (Kennedy,
'Euthanasia: To be or Not to Be', Colliers [May 20, 1939), pp. 15, 58; reprinted in Colliers [Apr. 22, 1950], pp. 13, 51)
37
Banks, op. cit. (n. 14 above), 101, 106. According to him, neither
'pain' nor 'incurability' 'is capable of precise and final definition, and indeed if each case had to be argued in open court there would be conflict
of medical opinion in practically every instance'. (Id., 104)
38
Wolbarst, 'Legalize Euthanasia!', The Forum, 94 (1935), 330, 332. But
see Wolbarst, 'The Doctor Looks at Euthanasia,' Medical Record, 149
( I 939), 354•
39
Wolbarst, 'Legalize Euthanasia!', loc. cit.
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Ibid., 332.
41
Op. cit. (n. 27 above), p. 39•
42
As to how bad the bad physician can be, see generally, even with a
grain of salt, Belli, Modern Trials, 3 (1954), §§ 327-53. See also Regan,
Doctor and Patient and the Law (3rd edn, 1956), pp. I 7-40.
43
As Williams points out (p. 295), Dr Millard introduced the topic of
euthanasia into public debate in 1932 when, in his presidential address to
the Society of Medical Officers of Health, he advocated that 'mercy-killing'
should be legalized. In moving the second reading of the Voluntary
Euthanasia Bill, Lord Ponsonby stated that 'the movement in favour of
drafting a Bill' had 'originated' with Dr Millard. (House of Lords Debates,
103, 5th series [1936], cols 466-7)
44
'The Case for Euthanasia', Fortnightly Review, 136 (1931), 701,
717. Under his proposed safeguards (two independent doctors, followed by a 'medical referee') Dr Millard viewed error in diagnosis as a
non-deterrable 'remote possibility'. (Ibid.)
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Euthanasia opponents readily admit this. See e.g. Miller, op. cit. (n.
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Op. cit., 702.
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research scientists, but an ill patient is not subject to experimental control, nor are his reactions always predictable. A good physician employs his
scientific tools whenever they are useful, but many are the times when
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See Williams, p. 283.
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James, 'Euthanasia-Right or Wrong?', Survey Graphic (May 1948),
pp. 241, 243; Wolbarst, 'The Doctor Looks at Euthanasia', Medical
Record, 149 (1939), 354, 355,
u Thus Dr Millard in his leading article, op. cit. (n. 44 above), 710,
states: 'A patient who is too ill to understand the significance of the step
he is taking has got beyond the stage when euthanasia ought to be administered. In any case his sufferings are probably nearly over.' Glanville Williams similarly observes (pp. 342-4): 'Under the bill as I have proposed to
word it, the consent of the patient would be required, whereas it seems that
some doctors are now accustomed to give fatal doses without consulting
the patient. I take it to be clear that no legislative sanction can be accorded
to this practice, in so far as the course of the disease is deliberately anticipated. The essence of the measures proposed by the two societies is that
euthanasia should be voluntarily accepted by ,the patient.... The measure
here proposed is designed to meet the situation where the patient's consent
to euthanasia is clear and incontrovertible.'
53
Emerson, 'Who Is Incurable? A Query and a Reply', New York Times
(Oct. 22, 1933), § 8, p. 5 col. 1.
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Mmer, op. cit. (n. 27 above), p. 39.
u For advances in the treatment of cancer, see the fuller version of the
present article, op. cit. 1000-3.
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For a discussion of the legal significance of 'mercy-killing' by omission and Williams's consultation feature for affirmative 'mercy-killing',
seen. 19 above.
57 Williams, p. 283.
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Frank and Frank, Not Guilty (1957),
60 Rudd, 'Euthanasia', Journal of Clinical & Experimental Psychopathology, 14 (1953), 1, 4·
61
See United States v. Holmes, Federal Cases, 26, No. 15, 383 (C.C.E.D
Pa. 1842).
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See Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, Queen's Bench Division, 14 (1884),
273.
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Fuller, 'The Case of the Speluncean Explorers', Harvard Law Review,
62 (1949), 616.
84
Cardozo, op. cit. (n. 33 above), p. 113.
65
Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (1947), p. 399. Cardozo, on
the other hand, seems to say that without such certainty it is wrong for
those in a 'necessity' situation to escape their plight by sacrificing any life.
(Loe. cit. [n. 64 above]) On this point, as on the whole question of 'neces-
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sity', his reasoning, it is submitted, is paled by the careful, intensive
analyses found in Hall, op. cit., pp. 377-426, and Williams, Criminal Law:
The General Part (Wm Stevens, 1953; 2nd edn, 1961), pp. 737-44. See
also Cahn, The Moral Decision (1955). Although he takes the position that
in the Holmes' situation, 'if none sacrifice themselves of free will to spare
the others--they must all wait and die together', Cahn rejects Cardozo's
view as one which 'seems to deny that we can ever reach enough certainty
as to our factual beliefs to be morally justified in the action we take'. (Ibid.,
pp. 70-71)
Section 3.02 of the Model Penal Code (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958) provides
(unless the legislature has otherwise spoken) that certain 'necessity' killings
shall be deemed justifiable so long as the actor was not 'reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct'. The section only applies to a situation
where 'the evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is gr~;i._t~! than that
sought to be prevented by the law', e.g. killing one that -several may live.
The defence would not be available, e.g. 'to one who acted to save himself
at the expense of another, as by seizing a raft when men are shipwrecked'.
(Ibid., Comment to Section 3.02, p. 8) For 'in all ordinary circumstances
lives in being must be assumed . . . to be of equal value, equally deserving
of the law'. (Ibid.)
66
Cf. Macaulay, Notes on the Indian Penal Code (1851). Note B, p. 131,
reprinted in The Miscellaneous Works of Lord Macaulay, 1 (Bibliophile
edn), p. 252: 'It is often the wisest thing that a man can do to expose his
life to great hazard. It is often the greatest service that can be rendered
to him to do what may very probably cause his death. He may labour under
a cruel and wasting malady which is certain to shorten his life, and which
renders his life, while it lasts, useless to others and a torment to himself.
Suppose that under these circumstances he, undeceived, gives his free and
intelligent consent to take the risk of an operation which in a large proportion of cases has proved fatal, but which is the only method by which his
disease can possibly be cured, and which, if it succeeds, will restore him
to health and vigour. We do not conceive that it would be expedient to
punish the surgeon who should perform the operation, though by performing it he might cause death, not intending to cause death, but knowing
himself to be likely to cause it.'
67
Foreword by Dr Warren H. Cole in Management of Pain in Cancer
(Schiffrin edn, 1956).
68
Bonica and Backup, 'Control of Cancer Pain,' New Medicine, 54 (1955),
22; Bonica, op. cit. (n. 23 above), 35.
69
Ibid.
70
'The opinion appears to prevail in the medical profession that severe
pain requiring potent analgesics and narcotics frequently occurs in advanced
cancer. Fortunately, this does not appear to be the case. Fear and anxiety,
the patient's need for more attention from the family or from the physician, are frequently mistaken for expressions of pain. Reassurance and an
unhesitating approach in presenting a plan of management to the patient
are well known patient "remedies", and probably the clue to success of
many medical quackeries. Since superficial psychotherapy as practiced by
physicians without psychiatric training is often helpful, actual psychiatric
treatment is expected to be of more value. Unfortunately, the potential
therapeutic usefulness of this tool has barely been explored.' (Laszlo and
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Spencer, 'Medical Problems in the Management of Cancer', Medical Clinics
of N. America, 37 [1953], 869, 875)
11 Ibid. 'Placebo' medication is medication having no pharmacologic effect
given for the purpose of pleasing or humouring the patient. The survey was
conducted on patients in Montefiore Hospital, New York City. One clear
implication is that 'analgesics should be prescribed only after an adequate
trial of placebos'.
12 The one thing agreed upon by the eminent physicians Abraham L.
Wolbarst, later an officer of the Euthanasia Society of America, and James
J. Walsh in their debate on 'The Right to Die' was that very, very few
people ever really want to die.
Dr Walsh reported that in all the time he worked at Mother Alphonsa's
Home for Incurable Cancer he never heard one patient express the wish
that he 'would be better off dead' and 'I know, too, that Mother Alphonsa
had very rarely heard it'. 'On the other hand,' adds Walsh, 'I have often
heard neurotic patients wish that they might be taken out of existence because they could no longer bear up under the pain ,they were suffering....
They were overcome mainly by self-pity. Above all, they were sympathy
seekers . . • of physical pain there was almost no trace, but they were
hysterically ready, so they claimed to welcome death.' (Walsh, 'Life Is
Sacred', The Forum, 94 [1935], 333) Walsh's opponent, Dr Wolbarst, conceded at the outset that 'very few incurables have or express the wish to
die. However great their physical suffering may be, the will to live, the
desire for life, is such an overwhelming force that pain and suffering become bearable and they prefer to live'. (Wolbarst, 'Legalize Euthanasia!',
Ioc. cit. [n. 38 above]) The first 'lesson' the noted British physician A.
Leslie Banks learned as Resident Officer to cancer wards at the Middlesex
Hospital, London, was that 'the patients, however ill they were and however much they suffered, never asked for death'. (Banks, 'Euthanasia',
Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, 26 [1950], 297, 301)
78 On p. 241 of 'Euthanasia-Right or Wrong', op. cit. (n. 51 above),
Selwyn James makes considerable hay of the Euthanasia Society of America's
claim that numerous cancer patients telephone the Society and beg for a
doctor who will administer euthanasia. If a person retains sufficient physical and mental ability to look up a number, get to a telephone and dial,
does he really have to ask others to deal him death? That is, if it is death
he really desires and not, say, attention or pity.
1,,
Williams, p. 283.
13 L. A. Tollemache-and not since has there been a more persuasive
euthanasiast-made an eloquent plea for voluntary euthanasia ('The New
Cure for Incurables', Fortnightly Review, 19 [1873], 218) in support of a
similar proposal the previous year (S. D. Williams, Euthanasia [1872]).
Tollemache's article was bitterly criticized by The Spectator, which stated:
'[l]t appears to be quite evident, though we do not think it is expressly
stated in Mr Tollemache's article, that much the strongest arguments to
be alleged for putting an end to human sufferings apply to cases where you
cannot by any possibility have the consent of the sufferer to that course.'
('Mr Tollemache on the Right to Die', The Spectator, 46 [1873], 206) In
a letter to the editor, Mr Tollemache retorted: 'I tried to make it clear
that I disapproved of such relief ever being given without the dying man's
express consent. . . . But it is said that all my reasoning would apply to
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cases like lingering paralysis, where the sufferer might be speechless. I
think not . . . where these safeguards cannot be obtained, the sufferer must
be allowed to linger on. Half a loaf, says the proverb, is better than no
bread; one may be anxious to relieve what suffering one can, even though
the conditions necessary for the relief of other (and perhaps worse) suffering may not exist. . . • . I have stated my meaning thus fully, because I
believe it is a common misunderstanding of Euthanasia, that it must needs
involve some such proceedings as the late Mr Charles Buxton advocated
(not perhaps quite seriously)-namely, the summary extinction of idiots
and of persons in their dotage.' ('The Limits of Euthanasia', The Spectator, 46 [1873], 240) I give this round to the voluntary euthanasiasts,
76
Williams, pp. 297-8.
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House of Lords Debates, 103, 5th series (1936), cols 466, 471.
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid., 169 (1950), cols 551, 559.
80
New York Times (Jan. 17, 1938), p. 21 col. 8.
81
Ibid. (Jan. 27, 1939), p. 21 col. 7 (my italics). That the report was
accurate in this regard is underscored by Mr Nixdorff's letter to the editor,
wherein he complained only that 'the patient who petitions the court for
euthanasia should not be described as a "voluntary" ' and that 'the best
definition of euthanasia is "merciful release" ' rather than 'mercy "killing"
or even mercy "death"' because 'being killed is associated with fear, injury
and the desire to escape' and 'many people dislike even to talk about
death'. (Ibid. [Jan. 30, 1939], p. 12 col. 7)
82
Ibid. (Feb. 14, 1939), p. 2 col. 6,
83
See n. 36 and accompanying text.
1M
See n. 88-92 below. More than a hundred reporters, photographers and
broadcasters attended the Sander trial. In ten days of court sessions, the
press corps filed 1,600,000 words. ('Not Since Scopes?', Time Magazine
[March 13, 1950], p. 43)
85
New York Times (Jan. 12, 1950), p. 54 col 1.
86
Ibid. Gan 9, 1950), p. 40 col. 2.
87
Ibid. (Jan. 18, 1950), p. 33 col. 5.
88
Ibid. (Feb. 24, 1950), p. 1 col. 6; ibid. (Feb. 28, 1950), p. 1 col. 2;
'Similar to Murder', Time Magazine (March 6, 1950), p. 20. Although Dr
Sander's own notation was to the effect that he had given the patient 'ten
cc of air intravenously repeated four times' and that the patient 'expired
within ten minutes after this was started' (New York Times [Feb. 24, 1950],
p. 15 col. 5; 'Similar to Murder', loc. cit.), and the attending nurse testified
that the patient was still 'gasping' when the doctor injected the air (New
York Times [Feb. 28, 1950], p. 1 col. 2), the defendant's position at the
trial was that the patient was dead before he injected the air (ibid. [March
7, 1950], p. 1 col. 1; 'The Obsessed', Time Magazine [March 13, 1950], p.
, 23); his notes were not meant to be taken literally, 'it's a casual dictation •.. merely a way of closing out the chart' (New York Times [March
7, 1950], p. 19 col. 2). Dr Sander was acquitted. (Ibid. [March 10, 1950],
p. 1 col. 6) The alleged 'mercy-killing' split the patient's family: the husband and one brother sided with the doctor; another brother felt that the
patient's fate 'should have been left to the will of God'. ('40 cc of Air',
Time Magazine [Jan. 9, 1950], p. 13) Shortly afterwards, Dr Sander's licence
to practise medicine in New Hampshire was revoked, but was soon restored.
(New York Times [June 29, 1950], p, 31 col, 6) He was also ousted from his
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county medical society, but after four years' struggle gained admission to
one. (Ibid. [Dec. 2, 1954], p. 25 col. 6)
89
Ibid. (Jan. 28, 1950), p. 30 col. 1; ibid. (Feb. 1, 1950), p. 54 col. 3;
ibid. (Feb. 2, 1950), p. 22 col. 5; 'For Love or Pity', Time Magazine (Feb.
6, 1950), p. 15; 'The Father Killer', Newsweek (Feb. 13, 1950), p. 21. Miss
Paight was acquitted on the ground of 'temporary insanity'. (New York
Times [Feb. 8, 1950], p. 1 col. 2)
90
'The Father Killer', Newsweek (Feb. 13, 1950), p. 21.
91
See n. 89 above. Miss Paight was obsessed with the idea that 'Daddy
must never know he had cancer'. (New York Times [Jan. 28, 1950], p. 30
col. 1)
92
' "I had to do it. I couldn't bear to see him suffering." ... Once, when
she woke up from a strong sedative, she said: "Is Daddy dead yet? I can't
ever sleep until he is dead."' ('The Father Killer', loc. cit.)
93 Rex v. Simpson (Criminal Appeals Reports, 11, p. 218; Law Journal
King's Bench, 84 [1915], 1893) dealt with a young soldier on leave, who,
while watching his severely ill child and waiting for his unfaithful wife to
return home, cut the child's throat with a razor. His statement was as follows: 'The reason why I done it was I could not see it suffer any more
than what it really had done. She was not looking after the child, and it
was lying there from morning to night, and no one to look after it, and I
could not see it suffer any longer and have to go away and leave it.' Simpson was convicted of murder and his application for leave to appeal dismissed. The trial judge was held to have properly directed the jury that
they were not at liberty to find a verdict of manslaughter, though the prisoner killed the child 'with the best and kindest motives'.
94
Told to undergo a serious operation, and worried about the fate of her
thirty-one-year-old imbecile son if she were to succumb, sixty-two-year-old
Mrs May Brownhill took his life by giving him about a hundred aspirins
and then placing a gas-tube in his mouth. (The Times, London [Oct. 2,
1934], p. 11 col. 2; New York Times [Dec. 2, 1934], p. 25 col. 1; ibid.
[Dec. 4, 1934], p. 15 col. 3) Her family doctor testified that the boy's life
had been 'a veritable living death'. (The Times, London [Dec. 3, 1934], p.
11 col. 4) She was sentenced to death, with a strong recommendation for
mercy (ibid.; also New York Times [Dec. 2, 1934], p. 25 col. 1), then reprieved two days later (The Times, London [Dec. 4, 1934], p. 14 col. 2),
and finally pardoned and set free three months la,ter (ibid. [March 4, 1935],
p. 11 col. 3; 'Mother May's Holiday', Time Magazine [March 11,
1935], p. 21). According to one report, the Home Office acted 'in response
to nation-wide sentiment'. (New York Times [March 3, 1935), p. 3 col. 2)
The Chicago Tribune report of the case is reprinted in Harno, Criminal
Law and Procedure (4th edn, 1957), p. 36 n. 2. Incidentally, Mrs Brownhill's own operation was quite successful. (The Times, London [Dec. 3,
1934), p. 11 col. 4)
9s
Gordon Long gassed his deformed and imbecile seven-year-old daughter
to death, stating he loved her 'more so than if she had been normal'.
('Goodbye', Time Magazine [Dec. 2, 1946], p. 32) He pleaded guilty and
was sentenced to death, but within a week the sentence was commuted to
life imprisonment. (The Times, London [Nov. 23, 1946), p. 2 col. 7; ibid,
[Nov. 29, 1946], p. 2 col. 7)
96
For the American cases referred to here, see Minnesota Law Review,
42 (1958), 1021.
E

129

Yale Kamisar
In 'The Doctor Looks at Euthanasia', loc. cit. (n. 38 above), Dr Wolbarst describes the Brownhill case as an 'act of mercy, based on pure
mother-love' for which, thanks to the growth of the euthanasia movement
in England, 'it is doubtful that this poor woman even would be put on
trial at the present day'.
In 'Taking Life Legally', Magazine Digest (1947), Louis Greenfield's
testimony that what he did 'was against the law of man, but not against
the law of God' is cited with apparent approval. The article continues:
'The acquittal of Mr Greenfield is indicative of a growing attitude towards
euthanasia, or "mercy-killing", as the popular press phrases it. Years ago,
a similar act would have drawn the death sentence; today, the mercy-killer
can usually count on the sympathy and understanding of the court-and his
freedom.'
98
Williams, p. 283 n. 1. For a discussion of the Simpson case, see n. 93
above.
99
Williams, p. 293. For a discussion of the Sander case, see n. 88 above.
The other case as Williams notes (p. 293 n. 2), is the same as that described
by Lord Ponsonby in 1936 in the House of Lords debate (see p. 107).
100
Williams, p. 293. Williams does not cite any particular part of the
39-page Silving article, 'Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal
Law', op. cit. (n. 3 above), but in context he appears to allude to pp. 353-4
of that article.
101
In addition to the Sander case, the cases to which Williams seems to
refer are: the Paight case (see n. 89-92 above and accompanying text); the
Braunsdorf case (see n. 96 above); and the Mohr case. Only in the Mohr
case was there apparently euthanasia by request.
102
According to the Royal Warrant, the Commission was appointed in
May 1949 'to consider and report whether liability under the criminal law
in Great Britain to suffer capital punishment for murder should be limited
or modified', but was precluded from considering whether capital punishment should be abolished. (Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
Report (1953], Cmd No. 8932, p. iii) For an account of the circumstances
which led to the appointment of the Commission, see Prevezer, 'The English Homicide Act: A New Attempt to Revise the Law of Murder', Columbia Law Review, 57 (1957), 624, 629.
103
'It was agreed by almost all witnesses' that it would 'often prove extremely difficult to distinguish killings where the motive was merciful from
those where it was not'. (Report, para. 179) Thus the Commission 'reluctantly' concluded that 'it would not be possible' to frame and apply a
definition which would satisfactorily cover these cases. (Ibid., para. 180)
10"
Ibid.
105
Minutes of Evidence (Dec. r, 1949), pp. 219-20. Mr Hughes, however,
would try the apparent 'mercy-killer' for murder rather than manslaughter,
'because the evidence should be considered not in camera but in open court,
when it may turn out that it was not manslaughter'. (Ibid., para. 2825)
'[T]he onus should rest upon the person so charged to prove that it was
not a malicious, but a merciful killing'. (Ibid., para. 2826)
106
Minutes of Evidence (Jan. 5, 1950), para. 3120. The Lord Chief
Justice did not refer to the case by name, but his reference to Brownhill
is unmistakable. For an account of this case, see n. 94 above.
107
Ibid.
108
Ibid., para. 3315.
97
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Ibid.
Williams, p. 310.
111
Ibid.
112
Banks, 'Euthanasia', op. cit. (n. 72 above), 297, 305.
11 3
'Mental diseases are said to be responsible for as much time lost in
hospitals as all other diseases combined.' (Boudreau, 'Mental Health: The
New Public Health Frontier', Annals of the American Academy of Political
~ Social Science, 286 [1953), 1) Some twenty years ago, there were 'over
900,000 patients under the care and supervision of mental hospitals'.
(Felix and Kramer, 'Extent of the Problem of Mental Disorders', op. cit.
this n., 5, 10) Taking only the figures of persons sufficiently ill to warrant
admission into a hospital for long-term care of psychiatric disorders, 'at the
end of 1950 there were 577,000 patients . . . in all long-term mental hospitals'. (Ibid., 9) This figure represents 3.8 per thousand population, and
a 'fourfold increase in number of patients and a twofold increase in ratio
of patients to general population since 1903'. (Ibid.) 'During 1950, the
state, county and city mental hospitals spent $390,0·00,ooo for care and
maintenance of their patients.' (Ibid., 13)
114
Williams, pp. 311-12.
115
See A1innesota Law Review, 42 (1958), 1027-8.
116
Dr Foster Kennedy believes euthanasia of congenital idiots has two
major advantages over voluntary euthanasia: (1) error in diagnosis and
possibility of betterment by unforeseen discoveries are greatly reduced, and
(2) there is not mind enough to hold any dream or hope which is likely
to be crushed by the forthright statement that one is doomed, a necessary
communication under a voluntary euthanasia programme. Kennedy's views
are contained in 'Euthanasia: To Be or Not to Be', op. cit. (n. 36 above),
15; reprinted, with the notation that his views remained unchanged, op.
cit. (n. 36), 13; 'The Problem of Social Control of the Congenital Defective,' op. cit. (n. 36), 13. See also text quoted n. 36 above.
117
The Fortune Quarterly Survey: IX, Fortune Magazine (July 1937),
pp. 96, 106. Actually, a slight majority of those who took a position on the
defective infants favoured euthanasia under certain circumstances since 45
per cent approved under certain circumstances, 40.5 per cent were unconditionally opposed, and 14.5 per cent were undecided. In the case of
the incurably ill, only 37.3 per cent were in favour of euthanasia under
any set of safeguards, 47.5 per cent were flatly opposed, and 15.2 per cent
took no position.
Every major poll taken in the United States on the question has shown
popular opposition to voluntary euthanasia. In 1937 and 1939 the American Institute of Public Opinion polls found 46 per cent in favour, 54 per
cent opposed. A 1947 poll by the same group found only 37 per cent in
favour, 54 per cent opposed and 9 per cent of no opinion. For a discussion
of these and other polls by various newspapers and a breakdown of the public attitude on the question in terms of age, sex, economic and educational
levels, see note, 'Judicial Determination of Moral Conduct in Citizenship
Hearings', Univ. of Chicago Law Review, 16 (1948), 138, 141-2 and n. 11.
As Williams notes, however (p. 296), a 1939 British Institute of Public
Opinion poll found 68 per cent of the British in favour of some form of
legal euthanasia.
11 8
The Fortune Quarterly Survey, op. cit. (n. I 1 7 above), p. 106.
119
Mitscherlich and Meilke, Doctors of Infamy (1949), p, 114. The Reich
109
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Committee for Research on Hereditary Diseases and Constitutional Susceptibility to Severe Diseases originally dealt only with child patients up to the
age of three; but the age limit was later raised to eight, twelve and
apparently even sixteen or seventeen. (Ibid., p. 116)
120
II Kings, 6: 32, quoted and applied in Sperry, 'The Case against
Mercy Killing', American Mercury, 70 (1950), 271,276.
121
Williams, pp. 280-1. At this point Williams is quoting from Sullivan.
Catholic Teaching on the Morality of Euthanasia (1949), pp. 54-5. This
thorough exposition of the Catholic Church's attitude to euthanasia was
originally published by the Catholic Univ. of America Press, then republished in 1950 by the Newman Press under the title The Morality of Mercy
Killing (cf. n. 11 above).
122
Chesterton, 'Euthanasia and Murder', Joe. cit. (n. 8 above).
123
Alexander, 'Medical Science under Dictatorship', New England Journal
of Medicine, 241 (1949), 39, 40, 44 (my italics). To the same effect is
Ivy, 'Nazi War Crimes of a Medical Nature', Journal of the American Medical Association, 139 (1949), 131, 132, concluding that the practice of
euthanasia was a factor which led to 'mass killing of the aged, the chronically ill, "useless eaters" and the politically undesirable', and Ivy, 'Nazi
War Crimes of a Medical Nature', Federation Bulletin, 33 (1947), 133, 142,
noting that one of the arguments the Nazis employed to condone their
criminal medical experiments was that 'if it is right to take the life of useless and incurable persons, which as they point out has been suggested in
England and the United States, then it is right to take the lives of persons
who are destined to die for political reasons'. (Drs Leo Alexander and I.
C. Ivy were both expert medical advisers to the prosecution at the Nuremberg Trials.)
See also the entry for Nov. 25, 1940, in Shirer, Berlin Diary (1941), pp.
454, 458-9: 'I have at last got to the bottom of these "mercy killings".
It's an evil tale. The Gestapo, with the knowledge and approval of the
German government, is systematically putting to death the mentally deficient population of the Reich . . . . X, a German, told me yesterday that
relatives are rushing to get their kin out of private asylums and out of the
clutches of the authorities. He says the Gestapo is doing to death persons
who are merely suffering temporary derangement or just plain nervous
breakdown. What is still unclear to me is the motive for these murders.
Germans themselves advance three: ... [3] That they are simply the result
of the extreme Nazis deciding to carry out their eugenic and sociological
ideas . . . . The third motive seems most likely to me. For years a group of
radical Nazi sociologists who were instrumental in putting through the
Reich's sterilization laws have pressed for a national policy of eliminating
the mentally unfit. They say they have disciples among many sociologists
in other lands, and perhaps they have. Paragraph two of the form letter
sent to the relatives plainly bears the stamp of the sociological thinking: "In
view of the nature of his serious, incurable ailment, his death, which saved
him from a lifelong institutional sojourn, is to be regarded merely as a
release".'
This contemporaneous report is supported by evidence uncovered at the
Nuremberg Medical Trial. Thus, an August 1940 form letter to the relatives of a deceased mental patient states in part: 'Because of her grave
mental illness life was a torment for the deceased. You must therefore look
on her death as a release'. This form letter is reproduced in Mitscherlich
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and Mielke, op. cit. (n. 119 above), p. 103. Dr Alexander Mitscherlich and
Mr Fred Mielke attended the trial as delegates chosen by a group of German medical societies and universities.
According to the testimony of the chief defendant at the Nuremberg
Medical Trial, Karl Brandt, Reich Commissioner for Health and Sanitation and personal physician to Hitler, the Fuhrer had indicated in 1935 that
if war came he would effectuate the policy of euthanasia, since in the
general upheaval of war the open resistance to be anticipated on the part
of the Church would not be the potent force it might otherwise be. (Ibid.,
p. 91) Certain petitions to Hitler by parents of malformed children requesting authority for 'mercy deaths' seem to have played a part in definitely
making up his mind. (Ibid.)
124
Defendant Viktor Brack, Chief Administrative Officer in Hitler's private chancellery, so testified at the Nuremberg Medical Trial. (Trials of
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